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Introduction 
 
City space is highly contested space. As rapid urbanization takes hold 
around much of the world, contestations over city space—how that space is 
used and for whose benefit—are at the heart of many urban movements and 
policy debates. Among the most prominent sites of this contestation include ef-
forts to claim vacant or abandoned urban land and structures for affordable 
housing and community gardening/urban farming in many American cities,1 
the occupation and reclamation of formally public and private cultural institu-
tions as part of the movement for beni comuni (“common goods”) in Italy,2 and 
the rise of informal housing settlements on the periphery of many cities around 
the world.3 
 1. See infra Part I. 
 2. See infra Part I. 
 3. See infra Part I. 
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The impetus for much of this contestation is rooted in the neoliberal cri-
tique of contemporary urban development; namely the idea that public officials 
in cities around the world, and in particular “global cities,”4 are commodifying 
and selling to the highest bidders the collective resources of the city.5 As Saskia 
Sassen recently and provocatively queried, “[W]ho owns the city?” in an era of 
“corporatizing access and control over urban land” and “corporate buying of 
whole pieces of cities,” which is transforming the “small and/or public” into the 
“large and private” across so many cities around the world.6 As public officials 
relax local regulations and other rules to accommodate the preferences of pow-
erful economic interests, the poor and socially vulnerable populations are being 
displaced by an urban development machine largely indifferent to creating cit-
ies that are both revitalized and inclusive.7 
In tandem with the neoliberal critique, there is a powerful intellectual and 
social movement to reclaim control over decisions about how the city develops 
and grows and to promote greater access of urban space and resources for all 
urban inhabitants. First articulated by French philosopher Henri Lefebvre,8 the 
“right to the city” movement has manifested in efforts by progressive urban 
policymakers around the world to give more power to city inhabitants in shap-
ing urban space.9 While the movement has had some policy successes, some 
worry that it remains unclear what exactly is the “right” to the city and, specifi-
cally, the scale and scope of enhanced participation by urban inhabitants and 
expanded access to urban resources.10 Moreover, to the extent that the “right” 
 4. SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO (2001). 
 5. These collective resources include not only the land of the city and its open spaces 
and infrastructure, but also its culture and the array of goods and services that it 
provides its inhabitants. See generally DAVID HARVEY, REBEL CITIES: FROM THE 
RIGHT TO THE CITY TO THE URBAN REVOLUTION (2013).  
 6. Saskia Sassen, Who Owns our Cities and Why this Urban Takeover Should Concern 
Us All, GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/nov/ 
24/who-owns-our-cities-and-why-this-urban-takeover-should-concern-us-all. 
 7. In line with the much heralded theory advanced by Charles Tiebout, even 
struggling cities find themselves competing for mobile residents and mobile 
capital, skewing their policies toward attracting the “creative class”—high 
knowledge, entrepreneurial residents attracted to a host of urban amenities and 
promoting business-friendly, growth oriented policies. See generally Nestor M. 
Davidson & Sheila R. Foster, The Mobility Case for Regionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 63 (2013); Richard Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and 
the Democratic City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482 (2009). 
 8. Henri Lefebvre, The Right to City, in WRITINGS ON CITIES (1996), originally 
published as HENRI LEFEBVRE, LE DROIT A LA VILLE (Anthropos 1968).  
 9. See, e.g., EDWARD W. SOJA, SEEKING SPATIAL JUSTICE (2010); David Harvey, Right to 
the City, 27 INT’L J. URB. REGIONAL RES. 939 (2003). 
 10. What seems to matter most to advocates, however, is that the “right” be viewed as 
a collective and not individual right—that urban inhabitants have increased voice 
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to the city is dependent on a rights-endowing government, local or national, the 
odds again are quite low. Our current era is one of rights-retrenching and not 
rights-enhancing states, especially when it involves the protection of socially 
and economically vulnerable populations. 
Increasingly, progressive urban reformers are looking beyond the state (and 
for that matter the city) to sublocal forms of resistance, and cooperation, to 
make claims on urban resources and city space as a “commons.” These claims 
consist not simply of the assertion of a “right” to a particular resource; rather, 
they assert the existence of a common stake or common interest in resources 
shared with other urban inhabitants as a way of resisting the privatization and/
or commodification of those resources.11 In other words, the language of the 
“commons” is being invoked to lay claim to, and protect against the threat of 
“enclosure” by economic elites, a host of urban resources and goods which 
might otherwise be more widely shared by a broader class of city inhabitants.12 
in local decision making processes and exercise greater control over the forces 
(economic, social and political) shaping city space. See Mark Purcell, Excavating 
Lefebvre: The Right to the City and its Urban Politics of the Inhabitant, 58 GEO. L.J. 
99, 102 (2002) (stating that Lefebvre is clear that the decision making role of 
citidans—urban inhabitants—must be central, but that he is not explicit about 
what that centrality would mean, nor does he say clearly that decisions that 
produce urban space should be made entirely by inhabitants). Some would even 
include users of the city, in addition to its inhabitants, as part of the class of 
citidans who would hold this right. See WORLD URBAN FORUM, PROPOSED WORLD 
CHARTER ON RIGHT TO THE CITY (2004), http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/files/8218/ 
112653091412005_-_World_Charter_Right_to_City_May_051.doc/2005+-+World 
+Charter+Right+to+City+May+051.doc (web download); EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF 
TOWN PLANNERS, THE NEW CHARTER OF ATHENS (2003), http://www.ectp-ceu.eu/ 
images/stories/download/charter2003.pdf. The “right to the city” has also been 
incorporated into Brazil’s Constitution and City Statute. See C.F. arts. 182-183 
(Braz.); E.CID., Lei No. 10.257, de 10 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA 
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 11.7.2001 (Braz.). 
 11. See, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER, THINK LIKE A COMMONER: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO 
THE LIFE OF THE COMMONS 55-64 (2014); HARVEY, supra note 5, at 67-75; Dan 
Webb, Urban Common Property: Notes Toward a Political Theory of the City, 17 
RADICAL PHIL. REV. 371 (2014). 
 12. See Nicholas Blomley, Enclosure, Common Right and the Property of the Poor, 17 
SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 311, 315-26 (2008) (arguing that the poor may have a legitimate 
property interest in a department store or other land use in their community that 
is predicated on use, occupation and domicile); Patrick Bresnihan & Michael 
Byrne, Escape Into the City: Everyday Practices of Commoning and the Production of 
Urban Space in Dublin, 47 ANTIPODE 36, 42 (2015) (describing the creation of 
“independent spaces” outside of market and city control for a range of 
noncommercial activities, events and forms of social life “excluded by high rents 
and over-regulation”); Amanda Huron, Working with Strangers in Saturated Space: 
Reclaiming and Maintaining the Urban Commons, 47 ANTIPODE 963 (2015) 
(theorizing limited equity housing cooperatives as a commons). 
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What we are interested in is the potential for the commons to provide a 
framework and set of tools to open up the possibility of more inclusive and eq-
uitable forms of “city-making.”13 The commons has the potential to highlight 
the question of how cities govern or manage resources to which city inhabitants 
can lay claim to as common goods, without privatizing them or exercising mo-
nopolistic public regulatory control over them. Yet, the “urban commons” re-
mains under-theorized, or at least incompletely theorized, despite its appeal to 
scholars from multiple disciplines. Although the literature on natural resource 
“commons” and “common pool resources” is voluminous, it remains a chal-
lenge to transpose its insights into the urban context in a way that captures the 
complexity of the “urban”—the way that density of an urban area, the proximi-
ty of its inhabitants, and the diversity of users interact with a host of tangible 
and intangible resources in cities and metropolitan areas.14 
The “commons,” of course, has a long historical and intellectual lineage 
ranging from the enclosure movement in England,15 to Garret Hardin’s famous 
Tragedy of the Commons parable,16 to Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel prize-winning 
work on governing common pool resources.17 More recently, scholars across an 
array of specialties have conceptualized and articulated new kinds of commons, 
beyond those recognized in the traditional fields of property and environmental 
law. These “new” commons include knowledge commons, cultural commons, 
infrastructure commons, and neighborhood commons, among others.18 Like 
other newer forms of commons, the emerging literature on the urban commons 
must endeavor to conceptualize, identify, mark the boundaries of, and articu-
late the implications of its framework for different kinds of resources at differ-
ent scales in various urban contexts. 
As an initial matter, we contend that any articulation of the urban com-
mons needs to be grounded in a theory of property, or at least a theory about 
 13. GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING 
WALLS (2001). 
 14. The most recent literature on the urban commons is beginning to recognize this 
complexity. See generally URBAN COMMONS: MOVING BEYOND STATE AND MARKET 
(Mary Dellenbaugh et al. eds., 2015); URBAN COMMONS: RETHINKING THE CITY 
(Christian Borch & Martin Kornberger eds., 2015). 
 15. See, e.g., PETER LINEBAUGH, THE MAGNA CARTA MANIFESTO: LIBERTIES AND 
COMMONS FOR ALL (2008); TINE DE MOOR, THE DILEMMA OF THE COMMONERS: 
UNDERSTANDING THE USE OF COMMON-POOL RESOURCES IN LONG-TERM 
PERSPECTIVE (2015). 
 16. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968). 
 17. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
 18. Charlotte Hess, Mapping the New Commons 5 (Working Paper, 2008), http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1356835 (reviewing the vast literature 
and attempting to cohere similarities in the use and articulation of the commons 
across fields). 
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the character of particular urban resources in relationship to other social goods, 
to other urban inhabitants, and to the state.19 This is especially necessary given 
the centrality of property law in resource allocation decisions that affect owners, 
non-owners and the community as a whole.20 As David Super has poignantly 
written, property law has an important role in addressing widespread economic 
inequality by protecting those goods most essential to the well-being of a broad 
swath of society, rather than just protecting the goods that are disproportion-
ately held by the wealthy.21 As long as large segments of the population lack the 
security that property rights provide, he argues, many social problems will re-
main quite intractable.22 Although not invoking the utility of the commons, his 
poignant call for property law’s centrality in supporting the “wealth” of the 
poor is consistent with progressive urban reformers and scholars’ invocation of 
the commons on behalf of city inhabitants subject to the dispossession and dis-
placement that inevitably result from unfettered capital accumulation.23 
 19. Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Communities, 10 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 127, 128 (2009) (“[S]ystems of property have as their 
subject matter the allocation among community members of rights and duties 
with respect to resources that human beings need in order to survive and flourish” 
and thus “whenever we discuss property, we are unavoidably discussing the 
architecture of community and of the individual’s place within it.”).  
 20. Id. at 128; JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 32 (1988) 
(describing the problem of allocation as the central concern of property law).  
 21. David Super, A New, New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773 (2013). His suggestion 
is that longstanding concepts from property can be applied to recognize and 
protect the most important assets of low-income and other vulnerable people, 
most of which are relational rather than tangible assets. Id. at 1800, 1821-25 
(arguing in part for property law to honor and protect reliance interests in certain 
benefits and goods, per Charles Reich’s classic thesis on the subject, and relational 
interests in community and social ties of low-income and vulnerable populations 
subject to dispossession and dislocation); see also Sheila Foster, The City as an 
Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban Land Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527 
(2006). 
 22. As he argues, “broader access to the security that comes with property rights could 
go a long way toward addressing many of this country’s most salient said problems 
. . . security that allows [low-income and low-asset people] to make the most 
advantageous use of those resources they have.” Super, supra note 21, at 1792-93. 
 23. See, e.g., Blomley, supra note 12, at 315-26 (arguing that the poor may have a 
legitimate property interest in a department store or other land use in their 
community that is predicated on use, occupation and domicile). The roots of 
progressive reformers’ commons analysis is traceable to the work of Michael 
Hardt and Anthony Negri, who refer to the “common” (rejecting the term 
“commons” as a reference to “pre-capitalist shared spaces that were destroyed by 
the advent of private property”) as the product of shared efforts by city 
inhabitants. Cities are, as they argue, “to the multitude what the factory was to the 
industrial working class”; in other words, it is the “factory for the production of 
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Progressive urban scholars do acknowledge the necessity of a theory of 
property for the utility of an urban commons framework, even if that frame-
work is deployed in the service of a political movement rather than as a legal 
tool.24 Nevertheless, these scholars have neglected to develop the commons as a 
property concept or to engage the quite significant legal scholarship on the 
commons.25 To be fair, the legal literature on the commons is ideologically and 
theoretically far from where these progressive scholars begin and end their anal-
ysis of the urban commons. Legal scholars have tended to hew very closely to 
neo-classical economic assumptions when theorizing the issue of the commons 
and related property concepts.26 Even those legal scholars, including these au-
thors, who have taken a stab at theorizing the urban commons, do so through 
the analytical lens of Hardin’s Tragedy, which in much of legal literature is in-
terpreted as a story about suboptimal results from the cumulative actions of ra-
tional actors.27 That is, legal scholars have taken as the starting point the idea 
that the commons is an unrestricted and unregulated open access resource 
which allows uncoordinated actors to overconsume or overexploit the resource 
and then discuss solutions to avoid those tragic outcomes.28 
In this Article, we offer a more articulated and pluralistic account of the ur-
ban commons than currently exists in legal scholarship. In some instances, the 
characteristic of the resource under certain conditions mimics the conventional 
characteristics of what legal scholars and Elinor Ostrom refer to as a “common 
the common,” a means of producing common wealth. MICHAEL HARDT & 
ANTHONY NEGRI, COMMONWEALTH 250 (2009). 
 24. See e.g. Blomley, supra note 12, at 325-26 (“[A]lthough there are many potential 
problems with using a language of property . . . it can provide a powerful, extant, 
political register for naming, blaming and claiming;” also noting that property 
rights “for too long have been the exclusive domain of the Right, configured in 
restrictive and antisocial ways”). 
 25. This is not to say that they do not quote legal scholars. They cite to Joseph Singer’s 
work on the reliance interest and property rights and other scholars, but not to 
scholarship on the commons. See, e.g., Blomley, supra note 12, at 325-26. 
 26. See, e.g., Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Henry Smith, Semicommon 
Property Rights and Scattering in Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000); Lee 
Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 913-14 (2004).  
 27. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 26, 919-22 (2004) (describing Hardin’s tragedy as one 
in which users consume the resources beyond the point that they produce 
marginal benefits for anyone). 
 28. See Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, 2014 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1373 (2015); Sheila R. 
Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 60 
(2011); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Managing the Urban Commons, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
1995 (2012); Christian Iaione, The Tragedy of Urban Roads: Saving Cities from 
Choking, Calling on Citizens to Combat Climate Change, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 889 
(2009). 
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pool resource.”29 That is, the difficulty and cost of excluding competing users or 
uses of the resource render it an open access resource vulnerable to the tragic 
conditions of rivalry, overexploitation, and degradation. Under other circum-
stances, we argue, particularly for some property or urban goods “in transition” 
from private or public ownership to some future use (public or private), the 
commons is less a description of the resource and its characteristics and more of 
a normative claim to the resource.30 In these situations, the claim is to open up 
(or to re-open) access to a good—i.e., to recognize the community’s right to ac-
cess and to use a resource which might otherwise be under exclusive private or 
public control—on account of the social value or utility that such access would 
generate or produce for the community. 
This pluralistic conception of the commons also captures the ways that we 
can conceive of the city itself as a commons. From the descriptive framing of the 
commons, the city is an open access good subject to the same types of rivalry, or 
contestation, and congestion that needs to be managed to avoid the kinds of 
problems or tragedies that beset any other commons. Moreover, the ways in 
which progressive urban reformers and movements are making claims on the 
city resonates most strongly with the normative conception of the commons 
that we offer. In line with this conception, or claim, the city is a commons in the 
sense that it is a shared resource that belongs to all of its inhabitants. As such, 
the commons claim is importantly aligned with the idea behind the “right to the 
city”—the right to be part of the creation of the city, the right to be part of the 
decisionmaking processes shaping the lives of city inhabitants, and the power of 
inhabitants to shape decisions about the collective resource in which we all have 
a stake.31 
The commons framework, we argue, can provide a bridge between the 
normative claim to the city, and its resources, and the way in which those re-
sources and the city itself is governed. Recognizing that there are many tangible 
and intangible resources in the city in which many users and other actors have a 
stake, or claim, the question that this Article asks is: what are the possibilities of 
bringing more collaborative governance tools to decisions about how city space 
and common goods are used, who has access to them, and how they are shared 
among a diverse urban population? 
The analytical traction offered by invoking the literature on the commons 
to think through resource allocation problems is the window that it offers into 
 29. She defined a common pool resource as natural or manmade resource system 
“that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude 
potential beneficiaries from obtaining the joint benefits from its use.” OSTROM, 
supra note 17, at 30. That is, the resource is characterized by non-excludability and 
rivalry. See id. Note also that she rejected Hardin’s conceptualization of the 
commons, distinguishing his scenario as an “open access” resource with no 
boundaries, distinct from her conception of the common pool resource. 
 30. See infra Part I.C. 
 31. See, e.g., Purcell, supra note 10. 
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questions of management and control over those resources. Hardin famously 
postulated that threats of degradation and destruction of the commons give rise 
to either a system of centralized public regulation or the imposition of private 
property rights in order to avoid the “tragedy.32 Ostrom’s groundbreaking 
work, on the other hand, demonstrated that there are options for commons 
management that are neither exclusively public nor exclusively private. Ostrom 
identified groups of users who were able to cooperate to create and enforce 
rules for using and managing natural resources—such as grazing land, fisheries, 
forests and irrigation waters—using “rich mixtures of public and private in-
strumentalities.”33 
In previous work, we identified a number of small- and large-scale urban 
resources—neighborhood streets, parks, gardens, open space, among other 
goods—which are similarly being collaboratively managed by groups of hetero-
geneous users, often with minimal involvement by the state or the city.34 Some 
examples that we have analyzed in previous work include community garden-
ers, business improvement districts (BIDs) and community improvement dis-
tricts (CIDs), neighborhood park groups and park conservancies, and neigh-
borhood foot patrols.35 The emergence of these user-managed, but not user-
owned, resources, we think, represent not only a new way of managing urban 
commons but indeed a democratic innovation for how we distribute and man-
age common urban assets.36 
In this Article, we tease out from these examples (and others) a set of dem-
ocratic design principles that can be replicated to manage or govern a range of 
shared urban goods and resources. These principles—horizontal subsidiarity, 
collaboration, and polycentrism—reorient public authorities away from a mo-
nopoly position over the use and management of common assets and toward a 
shared, collaborative governance approach. In other words, the Leviathan state 
 32. Hardin, supra note 16, at 1245-47. 
 33. OSTROM, supra note 17, at 182. 
 34. See Foster, supra note 28, at 91-93; see also Christian Iaione, Local Public 
Entrepreneurship and Judicial Intervention in a Euro-American and Global 
Perspective, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 215 (2007); Iaione, supra note 28. 
 35. See Foster, supra note 28 (describing BIDs, community gardens, foot patrols, 
neighborhood park groups, and park conservancies as institutions that manage or 
govern common urban resources). 
 36. As Anna di Robilant has argued, our conceptions of property are constantly 
changing and many new forms of property involve and require mechanisms of 
democratic and deliberative governance structures to sustain them. Anna di 
Robilant, Property and Democratic Deliberation: The Numerus Clausus Principle 
and Democratic Experimentalism in Property Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 367 
(2014) (“[W]e have come to believe that, for some critical resources that involve 
public interests, use and management decisions should be made not by a single 
owner, whether public or private, but through a process that is democratic and 
deliberative.”).  
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gradually becomes what we call the facilitator, or enabling, state. The govern-
ance regime for shared urban resources becomes one without a dominant cen-
ter but instead one in which all actors who have a stake in the commons are 
part of an autonomous center of decision making as co-partners, or co-
collaborators, coordinated and enabled by the public authority. 
Similarly, by thinking of the city itself as a commons, we might look be-
yond the reigning public regulatory regime in most cities to more collaborative 
and polycentric governance tools capable of empowering and including a 
broader swath of urban residents in decisions about resource access and distri-
bution in the city. Most cities around the world have a system of land use laws 
(the public regulatory option that Hardin proposed as one solution) that man-
age city space and its resources to avoid conventionally tragic outcomes such as 
negative spillovers from incompatible land uses.37 There is healthy skepticism, 
however, about the effectiveness of the current regulatory regime to navigate 
the very urban politics of which progressive reformers complain,38 particularly 
the hold that the economic “growth machine”39 seems to have on urban devel-
opment and local officials.40 
In the last part of the Article, we begin to muse about what it might look 
like to scale up from the individual resource to the city level the democratic de-
sign principles that already characterize existing urban commons management 
structures.41 We conclude by proposing a new governance model—”urban col-
laborative governance”—for managing the city as a commons. This model re-
situates the city as an enabler and facilitator of collaborative decision making 
structure(s) throughout the city, and attends to questions of political, social and 
economic inequality in cities. We then explore two innovations in city govern-
ance—the “sharing city” and the “collaborative city”—which embody many of 
the principles, or pillars, of our urban collaborative governance model. 
 37. See infra Part II.A.  
 38. See Richard C. Schragger, Is a Progressive City Possible? Reviving Urban Liberalism 
for the Twenty-First Century, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 231 (2013) (identifying 
impediments, including a progrowth ideology that continues to dominate city 
politics, a federal political structure that weakens cities, and cities’ general 
estrangement from mainstream American politics.). 
 39. Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward Political Economy of Place, 
82 AM. J. SOC. 309 (1976). 
 40. For a contrary view, expressing doubt that many cities look like growth machines, 
see Vicki Been et al., Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the 
Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227 (2014) (providing results of an 
empirical study of over 200,000 lots in New York City that were considered for 
rezoning, demonstrating that homevoters, and not business and real estate 
interests, are more powerful in urban land use decisions than scholars, 
policymakers and judges have assumed). 
 41. We anticipate a much more in-depth, book treatment of this link in the near 
future. 
290 
 
Foster Iaione FINAL COPY.docx (Do Not Delete) 7/29/2016  4:57 PM 
THE CITY AS A COMMONS  
In Part I of the Article, we identify and analyze the variety of commons or 
common pool resources in the urban context. In Part II we examine some areas 
of property and land use law that may prove important tools for claiming, pro-
tecting and managing urban common pool resources. In Part III we explore and 
suggest some principles, institutional tools and mechanisms that foster and sus-
tain cooperative efforts to govern urban common resources. Part IV explores 
what it might look like to scale up these principles to govern the city itself as a 
commons to promote more inclusive forms of decision making and more equi-
table distribution of these resources. 
 
I. The Commons And The City 
 
In this Part, we offer a pluralistic conception of the urban commons, iden-
tifying the existence of, and potential for, different commons at different scales 
in the urban environment. We start by considering some of the conceptual dis-
tinctions that legal scholars have offered for understanding the characteristics of 
a commons. These distinctions matter not only for analytical clarity, but also 
because they tell us something about the nature of the challenges that such cer-
tain goods and resources face and the necessity for different kinds of legal pro-
tections and governance solutions. 
Building on these distinctions, we then explore the ways in which different 
kinds of urban resources can be considered a commons, or a common resource. 
First, we identify “raw” and vacant urban land as a commons; second, a variety 
of open spaces and infrastructure (streets, roads) in cities can constitute a 
commons; finally, we examine the claim that some abandoned or underutilized 
public and private structures and buildings in the city should constitute a 
commons. Some of these resources, under certain conditions, mimic the con-
ventional characteristics of an open access commons—subject to rivalry and 
overconsumption or degradation—and giving rise to classic commons man-
agement and governance dilemmas. For other resources, the commons claim is 
intended to open up access of the resource in order to produce other common 
goods or to enhance the social utility of the asset for a broader class of urban 
inhabitants. 
 
A. Conceptualizing the Commons 
 
Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons unfolds in the context of a quin-
tessential open access commons—an open pasture in which each herdsman is 
motivated by self-interest to continue adding cattle until the combined actions 
of the herdsmen results in overgrazing, depleting the shared resource for all 
herdsmen.42 The open access commons thus has as its baseline a resource in 
which use is unrestricted or unmanaged, and which allows uncoordinated ac-
 42. See Hardin, supra note 16, at 1244 (“As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to 
maximize his gain. . . . [Thus e]ach man is locked into a system that compels him 
to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited.”).  
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tors to overuse or overexploit the resource.43 As he argued, absent a system of 
private enterprise or government control (i.e., allocation of use and other 
rights), it would be difficult, if not impossible, to restrain the impulse of users 
to pursue their individual self-interests even when pursuit of those interests re-
sult in the degradation or exhaustion of the resource.44 
Pivoting off of Hardin’s insights, legal scholars and economists distinguish 
between “open access” and “limited-access” commons, on the one hand, and 
between public goods and common goods, on the other hand.45 Public goods 
(e.g. highways, transportation systems, public schools) are resources that, alt-
hough open access due to their “public nature,” do not present the problems of 
traditional commons because one user’s share or consumption of the good does 
not rival, or subtract from, another user’s.46 Moreover, even when public goods 
such as infrastructure become partially rivalrous, the government or private 
provider bears the responsibility of maintaining sufficient capacity and main-
taining the good as an open access one, usually on a common carrier basis.47 
Although certain forms of private property are held “in common” by a col-
lection of individuals and may include shared common space for the collection 
of rights-holders (e.g. a gated community or a condominium complex), in most 
respects this property follows the logic of and operates like private property.48 
These and other “limited-access” common interest communities may look like 
traditional “commons on the inside” for those who have access through owner-
 43. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons, 9 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & 
EVOLUTION 199, 199 (1994) (“[A]ll exploiters suffer in an unmanaged common.”). 
 44. See Hardin, supra note 16, at 1244-45 (arguing that individual users of the 
commons would always enjoy the full benefit of their use, but absorb only a small 
fraction of the marginal cost of that use). 
 45. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Questioning Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
817, 821-22 (2010). Further distinctions are made between toll goods, club goods, 
public goods, and common pool goods. Id. at 823-24; see also OSTROM, supra note 
17, at 48 (distinguishing between limited and open access commons, the former 
involving those resources typically operating pursuant to a set of explicit or 
implicit usage and membership contraints). 
 46. Solum, supra note 45, at 822.  
 47. Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons 
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 936-37 (2005).  
 48. In exchange for their association dues, owners in these common interest 
communities have access to common facilities, such as roads and recreational 
areas, and to private services, such as neighborhood security, trash collection, 
street maintenance, and lighting. The rules of the community can be highly 
restrictive and are administered by a private residential government elected by the 
owners. Often these communities are reluctant to pay for public goods outside of 
themselves and, some would argue, contribute to the privatization of urban space 
(and enclosure of the urban commons). See generally EVAN MCKENZIE, 
PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL 
GOVERNMENTS (1996). 
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ship or usage rights in the community, but very much operate like “[private] 
property on the outside” in that these communities are endowed with the right 
to exclude non-owners from their shared spaces or resources.49 Limited-access 
commons are able to avoid tragic outcomes because they operate through a set 
of explicit or implicit usage and membership constraints designed to protect 
against overconsumption and exploitation.50 On the other hand, truly open ac-
cess resources, like Hardin’s pasture, in which exclusion is impossible or costly, 
are vulnerable to the tendency toward rivalry, exploitation and degradation or 
exhaustion of the resources.51 
Another conception of the commons that appears in the legal literature, 
and that does not depend on subtractability or rivalry, or “tragedy,” is im-
portant for an urban commons analysis. As Carol Rose has written, there are 
some open-access resources, particularly land, in which increased use does not 
create rivalry but rather enhanced utility or value for the public, such that these 
resources become essential or highly functional resources for city inhabitants.52 
One example Rose offers is the customary right claimed by some communities 
to hold periodic dances, a custom held over a landowner’s objections, and in 
which each added dancer brings “new opportunities to vary partners and share 
the excitement.”53 In this and similar scenarios, the “comedy” of the commons 
is marked not by the impulse to rival each other to consume the good but in-
stead by the impulse to get more of the public to participate (e.g. “the more the 
merrier”), thus “reinforce[ing] the solidarity and well-being of the whole com-
munity” and enhancing the value of the resource and the activity taking place 
within it.54 
Rose found that some British courts considered these resources “inherently 
public property,” on the basis of the enhanced value that public use generated, 
and vested in the public the right to use property otherwise subject to exclusive 
 49. Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, 
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 155 (1988). 
 50. This is illustrated by Elinor Ostrom’s groundbreaking work on the management of 
natural resources by groups of users who set rules of membership and oversee 
usage of the resource. See OSTROM, supra note 17. 
 51. Fennell, supra note 26, at 913-14. 
 52. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986) (asserting that the public’s custom of 
dancing or carousing in a particular place, like the habit of traveling on certain 
roads, makes various lands essential to the public; by these customs the public 
communicates the value of certain resources to the community). 
 53. Id. at 767. 
 54. Id. at 767-68, 770 (“In an odd Lockeanism, the public deserved access to these 
properties, because ‘publicness,’ nonexclusive open access, created their highest 
value.”). 
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private control.55 These courts considered the customary use of the resource by 
the public a signal of the special social value or emotional investment for the 
community,56 such that the more individuals engaged or participated in the ac-
tivity the more valuable it became for that community.57 As she points out, this 
vesting of property rights in the “unorganized public” rather than in a “gov-
ernmentally-organized public” departs strikingly from the neo-classical eco-
nomic view of the commons.58 These cases also suggest, she argues, the means 
by which a commons may be self-managed by groups of the public as an alter-
native to exclusive ownership by either individuals or exclusive management by 
governments.59 
These two ideas of the commons—one based on the inevitable rivalry or 
subtractability of an open access resource, and the other based on the inherent 
public value of an open access resource (even if privately held) customarily uti-
lized in ways that suggest it is an essential or necessary one for the community 
of users—informs but does not limit our analysis below of different kinds of 
urban commons. In the next Part, we take the insights from these different con-
ceptions of the commons and expand them to capture urban commons at dif-
ferent scales and the idea that the city itself is a common resource. 
 
B. City Space as a Commons 
 
 Before the city, there was the land.  
- William Cronon60 
 
In his groundbreaking history of the development of Chicago in the 19th 
century, William Cronon recounts how Chicago was formed out of a city-less 
landscape, with its own “complex set of natural markers,” by people who mi-
grated there and created the urban landscape through cultural and economic 
exchanges. “By using the landscape, giving names to it, and calling it home, 
 55. Id. (describing British cases from the early nineteenth and twentieth centuries in 
which, for example, public use had capacity to expand human social interaction 
for members of “an otherwise atomized society”); see also Frischmann, supra note 
47, at 926-27 (noting that open access to infrastructure goods is often legally 
mandated because infrastructure goods are essential to the consumption or 
production of other goods). 
 56. Rose, supra note 52, at 711, 721 (noting that the custom must have existed for a long 
time and had to be well-defined and reasonable).  
 57. Id. at 767-68 (describing this as generating positive externalities or spillovers for 
other members of the public). 
 58. Id. at 711 (also pointing out that these property rights claims lacked the exclusivity 
that normally accompanies individual property rights entitlements).  
 59. Id. 
 60. WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE’S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST 23 
(1991).  
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people selected the features that mattered most to them and drew their mental 
maps accordingly. Once they labeled those maps in a particular way . . . natural 
and cultural landscapes began to shade into and reshape one another.”61 In this 
way, great cities are constructed, shaped, and re-shaped by the inhabitants that 
are drawn to them and the interactions among them. Like Hardin’s open access 
field, however, there is also the potential for tragedy resulting from congestion 
and overconsumption of urban land. 
 
1. Urban Land as a Common Pool Resource 
 
As one commentator succinctly explains, “the city analog to placing an ad-
ditional cow on the commons is the decision to locate one’s firm or household, 
along with the privately owned structure that contains it, in a particular posi-
tion within an urban area.”62 Congestion and overconsumption of city space 
can quickly result in rivalrous conditions in which one person’s use of that 
space subtracts from the benefits of that space for others. The classic example of 
rivalry is the creation of negative externalities resulting from locating a particu-
lar land use in close proximity to other land uses—for example, where a pollut-
ing factory is placed next to a home. As in Hardin’s open pasture, absent a sys-
tem that allocates use rights, it is difficult, if not impossible, to restrain the 
impulse of users to pursue their individual self-interests, even when pursuit of 
those interests result in the degradation or exhaustion of the resource. As he ar-
gued, such “freedom in the commons”—i.e., the lack of controls on individual 
behavior and self-interest—ultimately leads to its ruin and hence to the “trage-
dy.”63 
In most places in the world, threat of tragedy—the urban equivalent of 
overgrazing cows in Hardin’s example—from these individual choices are ad-
dressed through land use rules which control for consumption of city land and 
negative externalities. Zoning regulations manage much of city space like a 
commons, controlling density, height and bulk and by separating (or exclud-
ing) incompatible land uses as a way of limiting the impacts on the urban envi-
ronment more generally and on the space inhabited by other users of the com-
mons. Land use regulations are also aimed in large part at controlling and 
managing a variety of tangible and intangible aspects of the urban environment 
in which urban residents share a common stake—e.g. shared open spaces, infra-
structure, local amenities, and the quality of the physical environment (e.g., air, 
water, noise levels). In this way, land use regulation is designed to avoid the po-
tential overconsumption of urban space and also reduce (although by no means 
avoid) potential rivalry in the use of urban space. 
 61. Id. at 25. 
 62. As she further explains, “[s]uch structures and their operations, like grazing 
cattles, draw sustenance from, and visit impacts upon, the surrounding 
community.” Fennell, supra note 28, at 1382. 
 63. Hardin, supra note 16, at 1244. 
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In places without highly regulated systems for land management we can see 
very clearly the kind of modern day tragedy: where open land is available, in-
cluding here in the United States, raw urban (and rural) land is literally “up for 
grabs” for squatters, land speculators, and others who want to subdivide and 
sell the land (sometimes legally, sometimes illegally) to new settlers.64 Informal 
housing settlements, both in the developing and developed world, exist in unin-
corporated (and hence unregulated) urban areas, often at the fringe of growing 
cities, where poor inhabitants occupy land (either through squatting or pur-
chasing) and construct homes on that land. In the absence of building codes 
and other land use regulations residents often live without water or sewage 
lines, sidewalks or paved roads, drainage or flood control, creating health and 
safety risk throughout these communities and to neighboring communities.65 
This urban self-help, or urban informality, is, in part, a rational response to 
the scarcity of urban land and the very high entry barriers to formal housing 
markets.66 Urban land is being quickly consumed and its availability is slowly 
disappearing, raising many of the questions of commons management and gov-
ernance that beset other unregulated open access resources.67 As importantly, 
urban land is being developed in unsustainable ways and in a manner that plac-
es at risk of degradation many other parts of the urban metropolitan commons. 
These settlements place additional, unaccounted for demands on anarchic traf-
fic patterns and collapsing infrastructure in the metropolitan areas of which 
they are apart.68 The cost of this pattern of informal development—a patch-
work of market rate housing in the center city and substandard housing settle-
 64. As Jane Larson argues: “Most colonia settlements are extra-legal rather than illegal. 
When residents and developers created existing colonias, subdivision and sale of 
rural land for residential construction without provision of basic infrastructure or 
access to public services was lawful, and no building codes set housing standards. 
Yet where the state fails to regulate activities that in other settings are regulated 
according to accepted patterns, a kind of informality develops, albeit one built on 
legal and material nonconformity rather than illegality.” Jane E. Larson, 
Informality, Illegality and Inequality, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 140 (2002); see 
also Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J. 179 (1995). 
 65. See Esther Sullivan & Carlos Olmedo, Informality on the Urban Periphery: Housing 
Conditions and Self-Help Strategies in Texas Informal Subdivisions, 52 URB. STUD. 
1037 (2015). 
 66. In part it is also a predictable result of an “economic gravity model of urban 
development, in which exclusionary zoning interacts with cities’ magnetic pull on 
wage earners to generate unregulated, peripheral development for low-income 
families.” Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty and Exclusion 
at the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1099 (2008).  
 67. See, e.g., Sheila R. Foster, Urban Informality as a Commons Dilemma, 40 U. MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REV. 301 (2009). 
 68. See, e.g., MIKE DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS 128-29 (2006) (analyzing slum ecology); See 
also generally ROBERT NEUWIRTH, SHADOW CITIES: A BILLION SQUATTERS, A NEW 
URBAN WORLD (2005). 
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ments on the periphery—is but one version of the tragedy of the urban com-
mons. 
 
2. Open Space and Urban Agglomeration 
 
In addition to urban land itself as a commons, much of the infrastructure 
of the city is a commons. These open access goods—such as the streets, plazas, 
and parks draw to them the “unorganized public”69 and are places where prox-
imity breeds interaction among city inhabitants. It is often the character of 
these open spaces and the interaction between city inhabitants that create, or at 
least substantially add to, the culture and “vibe” of a city. 
As Lee Fennell has written, urban “interaction space”70 becomes the com-
mon pool resource that renders public spaces so valuable. In other words, inter-
action space facilitates a host of other goods that are made possible by the non-
excludability of the space and, ironically, from its potential for congestion. 
Those goods include knowledge exchange, social capital accumulation, and var-
ious other agglomeration benefits that accrue to individuals in close proximity 
to one another. Many scholars couch these benefits in economic terms, as the 
“positive externalities” that can result from urban proximity and density.71 Cap-
turing the positive gains of urban “interaction space” is in large part what draws 
commoners to public open spaces, and is also what in turn gives these spaces 
value. 
On a macro level, urban agglomeration economists argue that one of the 
main reasons individuals move to cities is to capitalize on the concentration, or 
agglomeration, of others from whom they can learn and with whom they can 
interact.72 As such, open access interaction spaces have value as an urban amen-
ity that adds to the attractiveness of cities, particular those that seek to draw to 
them what urban theorist Richard Florida has termed the “creative class”—a 
category that includes the well-educated and others with particular skills and 
 69. See generally Rose, supra note 52 (describing the “unorganized public” as users 
comprised of an indefinite and open-ended class of persons).  
 70. Fennell, supra note 28, at 1376-77 (using the term a bit more broadly to mean the 
place where all economic actors, firms and households choose to locate and 
choose to access a composite of urban goods).  
 71. Id. at 1373.  
 72. According to this view, individuals looking to increase their human capital gains 
are drawn to urban areas because they are able to more efficiently acquire skills 
due to the greater opportunities to interact with other highly educated, skilled and 
creative people who live, work and socialize in close proximity to one another—
thus increasing the rates of human capital accumulation, technological 
innovation, and ultimately urban growth. See generally Edward L. Glaeser et al. 
Growth in Cities, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1126, 1127-34 (1992); Edward L. Glaeser & 
Matthew G. Resseger, The Complementarity Between Cities and Skills, 50 J. 
REGIONAL SCI. 221, 242 (2010).  
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interests suited to the modern knowledge-based economy.73 The attraction of 
the creative class to a city or county has significant positive spillovers, creating 
an environment that is more open to innovation, entrepreneurship, and spur-
ring economic growth in the service sector. This leads not only to improved 
economic outcomes, which benefit the city and its residents, but also to creating 
the “buzz” of a “cool” city attractive to other urban migrants.74 
 
3. Tragedy of the Urban Commons 
 
Paradoxically, it is the openness of many city spaces that can also quickly 
result in an urbanized version of the tragedy of the commons. In other words, 
these same spaces that produce agglomeration benefits and other valuable social 
goods can quickly mimic the tragic conditions that beset common pool natural 
resources. Too much usage, either in volume or intensity, of a park or a neigh-
borhood street, for example, can quickly result in the kind of congestion that 
degrades these spaces. Similarly, certain types of uses can create incompatibili-
ties with many ordinary uses and conservation of such spaces, creating the con-
ditions for rivalry or subtractability. 
The tragedy of many city commons arises not, as in Hardin’s example, 
from a pre-political or pre-regulated space in which “everyone has privileges of 
inclusion and no one has rights of exclusion.”75 Rather, it arises as a result of 
weakly or poorly regulated space—i.e., what one of us has called “regulatory 
slippage.”76 In other words, these are spaces that were perhaps once heavily reg-
 73. Providing the kind of urban amenities that will attract highly mobile creative 
types, Florida argues, is fundamental to the growth of cities and metropolitan 
regions. To attract them, cities should offer amenities like the arts and a cultural 
climate that appeals to young, upwardly and geographically mobile professionals. 
See RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS, REVISITED (2012); see also 
Terry Nichols Clark et al., Amenities Drive Urban Growth, 24 J. URB. AFF. 493 
(2002).  
 74. FLORIDA, supra note 73, at 46-48; 244-49; see also WILLIAM FREY, BROOKINGS INST., 
YOUNG ADULTS CHOOSE “COOL CITIES” DURING RECESSION 1-2 (Oct. 28, 2011), 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2011/10/28-young-adults-frey 
(noting that, to the extent they are moving, young adults are headed toward metro 
areas that are known to have a certain vibe—college towns, high-tech centers, and 
so called “cool cities”). 
 75. Michael A. Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES IN L. 79, 84 (2001). 
 76. The government’s inability (or unwillingness) to effectively manage land over 
which it has exerted its jurisdiction creates the opportunity and the incentive for 
overuse (or misuse) of the land, and thus represents significant “regulatory 
slippage.” Foster, supra note 67, at 301.  
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ulated to avoid rivalry but where such control has slipped, for whatever reason, 
significantly behind previous levels of public control or management.77 
This tragedy of the city commons was the story reflected in the decline of 
many open spaces in U.S. cities in the 1970s and 80s in which a potpourri of us-
ers and uses came into conflict, leaving many streets, parks and other open 
spaces unsafe, dirty, prone to criminal activity, and virtually abandoned by 
most users.78 
This urban tragedy can also result from an increase in “chronic street nui-
sances”—such as in the case of excessive loitering, aggressive panhandling, graf-
fiti, or littering—that eventually begin to rival, if not overwhelm, other users 
and uses of open spaces.79 The resulting deterioration then escalated with the 
onset of a fiscal crisis and the decline in city appropriations, which many would 
argue sealed the fate of these cities for at least the ensuing two decades. 
This is not to claim that the tragedy of the city commons was a precipitat-
ing, or even predominant, cause of the decline of American cities in the latter 
half of the 20th century. Rather, it is simply to underscore the fragile line that 
separates out the kind of urban congestion that produces rivalry, or subtracta-
bility, and the kind that produces the species of agglomeration benefits and so-
cial wealth that endow those spaces with utility and with so much of their value 
for communities and for the city as a whole. The point is that the kind of open 
spaces, or commons, that are an essential part of cities and that give cities much 
of their value can be contested in ways that require rethinking the governance 
and management of those spaces. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, one response to the tragedy of many open access 
urban public spaces, which called into question the ability of public administra-
tions to steward these resources, has been the rise of the Park Conservancies 
 77. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative 
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 301-03 (1999) 
(describing “negative” slippage as a failure to act or lax supervision by regulators, 
as well as noncompliance with existing standards by regulated parties). 
 78. See ROY ROSENZWEIG & ELIZABETH BLACKMAR, THE PARK AND THE PEOPLE: A 
HISTORY OF CENTRAL PARK (1992) (recounting story of Central Park in New York 
City, which began deteriorating due to a poorly managed potpourri of users and 
events, resulting in increased maintenance and cleanup costs, which the city was 
not able to absorb; this deterioration escalated with the onset of the fiscal crisis in 
the 1970s, which devastated the entire urban park system, leaving many parks and 
recreational areas unsafe, dirty, prone to criminal activity, and virtually 
abandoned by most users). 
 79. See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of 
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1169 (1996) 
(defining chronic street nuisances as “when a person regularly behaves in a public 
space in a way that annoys—but no more than annoys—most other users, and 
persists in doing so over a protracted period” and arguing for a system of “public-
space zoning” which would separate incompatible behaviors/conduct in public 
spaces). 
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and Business Improvement Districts (BIDs). These public-private partnerships 
are widely credited for the revitalization of urban parks, streets and commercial 
areas at a time when those resources were suffering from public neglect and 
during times of fiscal strain on local governments.80 Park Conservancies and 
BIDs, along with community gardens and neighborhood watch groups, are ex-
amples of what we would call urban commons institutions—a subject to which 
we return in Part III. They are a way of managing common resources without 
privatizing the resource but allowing a collection of public and private actors to 
manage the resource within a nested governance structure.81 
As we have previously pointed out, these are not always unproblematic in-
stitutions from the standpoint of distributional equity82 and certainly should 
not be embraced uncritically. We highlight them here to suggest the impetus to 
find new ways of governing shared, open access resources under conditions of 
regulatory slippage. These examples, and others,83 illustrate that there are viable 
alternatives to managing these resources that do not involve a more assertive 
system of government control, enforcement of social norms through criminal 
law, or private governance of these spaces.84 
 
 
 
 
 80. See Foster, supra note 28, at 101-08 (reviewing the literature on the rise of BIDs and 
Park Conservancies during the 1990s in response to cities’ abdication of their 
stewardship over parks, “the general decline of city centers and commercial 
neighborhoods,” and “the attendant deterioration of street safety and consumer 
activity, as well as the inability of local governments to respond to these forces due 
to declining tax bases and limited resources”).  
 81. Id. 
 82. See, e.g., id. at 104 (“Park conservancies are criticized for imposing many of the 
costs that attend to the (at least partial) privatization of any public good—i.e., 
enabling gentrification, exacerbating ethnic and class tensions, and creating a two-
tiered park system which disadvantaged parks in less affluent neighborhoods.”); 
id. at 107 (“BIDs, both large and small, have generated a vigorous debate about the 
extent to which they exacerbate the uneven distribution of public services, create 
negative spillover effects (e.g., crime), over-regulate public space, displace 
marginal populations from those spaces, and suffer from a severe democratic 
accountability deficit.”). 
 83. Id. at 93-101 (also discussing community gardening collectives, neighborhood park 
“friends” groups, and neighborhood foot patrols).  
 84. Id. at 108-18 (describing why these institutions involve the relinquishment of some 
government control of the resources, enabling cooperative or collective 
management of the resources, yet also do not amount to privatization of the 
resource in that “these groups cannot regulate access to the resources, control or 
impose restrictions on individual behavior, or otherwise usurp the local 
government’s role in making various policy choices about use of the resource”). 
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C. Common Resources in the City 
 
The openness of cities, and the urban agglomeration that results, is a dou-
ble-edged sword for many urban communities. Cities are being shaped and re-
shaped to meet simultaneously the increasing demands of rapid urbanization 
and, as in the case of struggling cities, the need to more strategically attract new 
urban dwellers (such as the “creative class”) capable of revitalizing urban life. In 
addition to the more traditional concerns about congestion and rivalry, the 
openness of cities also brings with it the threat of dispossession and displace-
ment from places of deep attachment and meaning for residents. 
In these contestations over city space and resources, the commons claim 
has a distinctly normative flavor. The issue is not consumption of an open-
access resource which results in either negative or positive spillovers. Rather, it 
is a question of distribution and, specifically, of how best to “share” the finite 
resources of the city among a variety of users and uses.85 
For many urban inhabitants displaced by the market forces of gentrifica-
tion, what is being lost, or claimed, are goods (both tangible and intangible) 
that have meaning by virtue of the way that residents have historically used, or 
are presently using, the space. For those living amongst the ruins of urban dis-
investment, what are being claimed are goods that, although once fully owned 
and utilized by private or public owners, are now in transition and whose future 
ownership and use is indeterminate. Residents claim these goods in order for 
their communities to survive and function and to provide basic goods essential 
for human flourishing. 
 
1. Property in Transition 
 
In cities and neighborhoods characterized not by growth but rather by 
shrinkage and decline—think Detroit, Baltimore, Cleveland, Newark, Camden, 
etc.—many neighborhoods contain significant swaths of vacant land and vacant 
structures.86 Property becomes vacant typically as a result of a combination of 
factors including population loss, disinvestment, and abandonment. Much of 
this property is also located on land or in neighborhoods formally regulated by 
the local government but where the zoning designations governing the property 
are largely irrelevant because the future use of the property is uncertain. In oth-
er words, the land or structure is transitory, both in the sense that the land has 
been abandoned and not yet reclaimed (at least not formally in terms of transfer 
 85. See Fennell, supra note 26, 914 n.31, 919-22 (pointing out the distinction between 
distributive problems in the commons, in which users consume more than their 
“share,” and Hardin’s tragedy, in which users consume the resources beyond the 
point that they produce marginal benefits for anyone).  
 86. See, e.g., Georgette Chapman Phillips, Zombie Cities: Urban Form and Population 
Loss, 11 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 703 (2014) (describing zombie cities as 
decimated cities and arguing that current zoning and land use laws that focus on 
growth do not address these cities’ challenges).  
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of title), and because the land is moving away from a past use and towards a fu-
ture use that is unknown and unplanned. 
While in a transitory state, vacant land and structures are quite vulnerable 
to contestation of uses. Conflicts often emerge regarding present vs. future uses 
and different possibilities for future use. These conflicts exist between present 
owners of the land and the local government, and between the surrounding 
community and the local government, which may be hoping to sell abandoned 
property to private developers or investors. There are also conflicts among vari-
ous users who have near-unfettered access to the property and who may have in 
mind competing uses for the property. 
As we explain below, residents who live in these communities often begin 
using property that has been abandoned and which may be adding to the condi-
tions of blight in the surrounding community. In many cases, community 
members may begin to treat the property as an open access resource, utilizing it 
in ways that add value to the surrounding community and/or which produce 
goods for that community (as in the case of community gardens or urban farms 
or using abandoned homes to house the homeless). In other instances, public 
users conduct illegal activities (dumping, crime, etc.), which clearly does not 
add value to the surrounding community. 
Thus, in addition to creating the potential for tragedy, conflict surrounding 
the use of vacant or underutilized property in distressed cities also has the po-
tential to capture positive value for the community by virtue of using the prop-
erty to create goods (both tangible and intangible) that can be shared. Unlike 
Hardin’s tale of tragedy, in which adding an additional person to an open access 
resource subtracts value from the resource, opening up access to abandoned or 
vacant property instead can enhance its value to the community.87 
In some cases, however, there are competing ideas about the best use of the 
property and whom should benefit most directly from its use. For example: lo-
cal government officials might be interested in selling large swaths of vacant 
space in a blighted neighborhood to attract commercial intensive development 
or market rate housing as a means for attracting a new class of residents to their 
cities. Members of the community, however, might want to claim the land for 
“commoning” activities—such as to build a community garden or urban farm 
which enables residents to produce both tangible (food, green space, recrea-
tional space, and public safety) and intangible (social networks, mutual trust, 
fellowship, a sense of security) goods for the surrounding community.88 
 87. See Rose, supra note 52 (explaining that the non-exclusivity of the space can make 
the use of the commons valuable because the activities taking place within that 
space are exponentially enhanced by greater participation by the public and thus 
benefit from scale economies).  
 88. “Commoning” is a term popularized by historian Peter Linebaugh to describe the 
social practices used by commoners in the course of managing shared resources 
and reclaiming the commons. LINEBAUGH, supra note 15, at 59 (noting that the 
practice of communing can provide “mutual aid, neighborliness, fellowship, and 
family with their obligations of trust and expectations of security”). 
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In other cases, local residents may be pushing to transform the land or va-
cant structures into affordable housing units, a town commons, a community 
center, a charter school, or infrastructure for local businesses. In cities still 
struggling to revitalize their inner core, residents are working to transform en-
tire neighborhoods pockmarked with vacant lots and abandoned property into 
livable and affordable communities. This is what, now quite famously, occurred 
in the Dudley Street neighborhood of Boston in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Known at the time as one of the poorest areas of Boston, residents there 
claimed fifteen acres of vacant lots owned by the city and fifteen acres of vacant 
lots privately owned but with tax liens (with the help of the city’s eminent do-
main power) to create an “urban village” of affordable housing, shopping, open 
green space and a community center.89 Members of the neighborhood formed a 
community land trust into which these properties were placed and which will 
preserve the village as an affordable and accessible commons for future genera-
tions. 
 
2. Occupying the Commons 
 
When there is conflict about the future use of open, abandoned or vacant 
land or structures, the conflict is often highlighted or magnified by the illegal 
occupation of the resource as a way of claiming it as a common resource. This 
characterizes a number of social movements in the United States and abroad in 
which activists occupy vacant, abandoned or underutilized land, buildings and 
structures as a means of altering the underlying property arrangement of certain 
goods away from an exclusively owned good (either public or private) to one 
that is held open for and managed by a community of users.90 
These movements are responding to what they view as market failures and 
the failures of an urban development approach which has neglected the provi-
sion of goods necessary to human well-being and flourishing. The tactic of oc-
cupation is a form of resistance against the enclosure—through private sale or 
public appropriation—of these goods. Occupation is also a way of asserting that 
the occupied property has greater value or utility as a good either accessible to 
the public or preserved and maintained as a common pool resource. 
While not explicitly using the language of the “commons,” these contem-
porary “property outlaws,”91 are very much staking claim to the property in 
 89. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the Dudley Street 
Neighborhood Initiative).  
 90. Lisa T. Alexander, Occupying the Constitutional Right to Housing, 94 NEB. L. REV. 
245, 248 (2015) (exploring the ways in which property lawbreaking in this context 
can help “concretize the human right to housing in local American laws, associate 
the human right to housing with well-accepted constitutional norms, and establish 
the contours of the human right to housing in the American legal consciousness”). 
 91. See EDUARDO MOISES PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW 
SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTORS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 12, 18 
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transition as a common good. For example, in many parts of the United States, 
as well as in countries such as Brazil and South Africa, activists occupy and 
squat in foreclosed, empty, often boarded up homes and housing units (includ-
ing public housing units) as a means to convince municipalities to clear title 
and transfer these homes and units to communal forms of ownership.92 This 
“occupy” or “take back the land” movement is a response to the displacement 
of homeowners and tenants brought on by the confluence of the housing/
mortgage crisis and the forces of gentrification.93 As investors move to buy up 
foreclosed homes at auctions and flip them, or raise rents, nonprofit organiza-
tions propose instead to take some of these properties out of the real estate 
market altogether and to create either limited-equity apartments or long-term 
affordable rentals.94 
Moreover, the difficulty and high cost of excluding users, and the potential 
for rivalry, sometimes result in such abandoned structures becoming sites for 
illegal drug activities and other nuisances, adding to the visible blight and over-
all decline of the surrounding community.95 For this reason, it is perhaps not 
surprising that local officials (and in some instances local laws) often condone 
the occupation and transformation of these structures by community members 
who aim to return the asset to productive use in ways that beautify and improve 
the properties and, by extension, the surrounding neighborhood.96 Transferring 
(2010) (using “property lawbreaking” to intentional civil disobedience to challenge 
existing property laws). 
 92. See, e.g., Colin Moynihan, Umbrella House: East Village Co-op Run by Squatters, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/19/realestate/umbrella 
-house-east-village-co-op-run-by-former-squatters.html (reporting on a 
successful effort in New York City in which squatters occupied what was an 
abandoned city-owned tenement and which the City eventually turned over to the 
squatters with 10 other buildings they had taken over). 
 93. Alexander, supra note 90, at 268-70 (describing the “take back the land” 
movements in Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago and other American cities and 
indicating that these activists and their organizations learned from similar activists 
in South Africa and Brazil).  
 94. In at least one case, the houses are owned by Fannie Mae and activists are pushing 
it to sell them to a nonprofit whose goal is to buy up foreclosed properties with the 
aim of turning them into long-term affordable rental housing for neighborhood 
residents. Marisa Mazria Katz, Occupying Empty Houses and Airwaves to Fight 
Foreclosures in Boston, CREATIVE TIME REP. (July 1, 2014), http://creativetimereports 
.org/2014/07/01/editors-letter-july-august-2014-occupy-houses-fight-foreclosures-
in-boston-john-hulsey/ (reporting on City Live/Vida Urbana, a Boston based 
community group). 
 95. Alexander, supra note 90, at 271. 
 96. Id. at 271 (noting that local officials and police often tolerate and condone the 
“occupations” for this reason and noting that in one state, Illinois, there exists a 
statutory exception to prosecution for criminal and civil trespass for a person who 
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previously privately held structures to a community land trust, or converting 
them into deed-restricted housing, would keep these properties perpetually af-
fordable for low- and moderate-income households and would allow the resi-
dents to self-manage them as an urban commons.97 
In a similar way, the Italian movement for “beni comuni” (common goods) 
utilizes occupation to stake public claim to abandoned and underutilized cul-
tural (and other) structures in an effort to have these spaces either retained as, 
or brought back into, communal use.98 The most famous of these occupations 
is that of the national Valle Theatre in Rome. The theatre had become largely 
defunct as a result of government cuts for all public institutions, and the Italian 
Cultural Ministry transferred the management of the theater to the City of 
Rome. Out of fear by many that the City would then sell it to a developer as part 
of a larger project for a new commercial center, a collection of art workers, stu-
dents, and patrons occupied the theater.99 This occupation was followed by 
similar occupations of cultural institutions and other structures that were sub-
ject to privatization in cities all over Italy.100 In each case, the occupants’ aim 
“beautifies” unoccupied and abandoned residential and industrial properties). See 
also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-3(b-15)(d) (2012).  
 97. See Huron, supra note 12 (describing limited equity cooperative housing in 
Washington, D.C. as an urban commons).  
 98. See generally Saki Bailey & Ugo Mattei, Social Movements as Constituent Power: The 
Italian Struggle for the Commons, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL. LEGAL STUD. 965 (2013).  
 99. Saki Bailey & Maria Edgarda Marcucci, Legalizing the Occupation: The Teatro Valle 
as Cultural Commons, 112 S. ATLANTIC Q. 396 (2013) (recounting the occupation 
and background). According to official documents, the City of Rome and the 
Italian Cultural Ministry were not able to reach an agreement on the future of the 
Teatro Valle. The City of Rome appointed a special commission to prepare a 
proposal through a deliberative democracy process. This commission delivered a 
report, the Rapporto sul Futuro del Teatro Valle, which formed the basis for a new 
agreement between the two institutions. According to the report and the new 
agreement, the public use and management of Teatro Valle was reaffirmed and a 
participatory governance model proposed and agreed upon. See FRANCA FACCIOLI 
ET AL., ASSESSORATO CULTURA, CREATIVITÀ E PROMOZIONE ARTISTICA DI ROMA 
CAPITALE, RAPPORTO SUL FUTURO DEL TEATRO VALLE (June 2014); Lorenzo 
Galeazzi, “This Is The Future Of The Valley Theater”. But Marino Keeps Hidden The 
Dossier, IL FATTO QUOTIDIANO (July 9, 2014), http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/ 
2014/07/09/questo-il-futuro-del-teatro-valle-ma-marino-nasconde-il-
dossier/105448 (report embedded). 
 100. Bailey & Mattei, supra note 98, at 996-97 (listing as examples the Cinema Palazzo 
in Rome, the Marinoni Theater in Venice, the Coppola Theater in Catania, the 
Asilo Filangieri in Naples, the Garibaldi Theater in Palermo, the Rossi Theater in 
Pisa, the Pinelli Theater in Messian and the Macao, a thirty-one-story building, in 
Milan).  
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was “to recover people’s possession of under-utilized” structures and “open up” 
these spaces for the flourishing of common goods like culture.101 
 
3. The Production of the Commons 
 
The push to effectuate the transformation of vacant, abandoned or un-
derutilized property from an exclusively private (or public) good to a commu-
nally held good is in part an effort to formalize the way in which users are al-
ready treating the good—as an open access good or as a user-managed 
commons. In large part, however, the basis for claiming the property for collec-
tive use or consumption is premised on the utility or value that these structures 
have for a broader group of users than exclusive ownership allows. In other 
words, the value generated by transforming these vacant structures into a public 
or community good—say a community garden, an urban farm, affordable 
housing, or cooperatively owned community assets—is said to outweigh (or at 
least heartily compete with) the value that these structures would retain under 
their existing use, whether they remained vacant or sold on the market for prof-
it. 
This is not a cold utilitarian calculus according to which the value that 
maximizes overall social welfare prevails. Rather, it is an argument that the 
utility of claiming, or reclaiming, property as a commons lies in its normative 
relationship to the community, whether on the scale of a block, neighborhood 
or city. Martin Kornberger and Christian Borch make the astute point that what 
gives the urban commons its value is the function of the human activity and 
network in which the resource is situated.102 In other words, “value is the corol-
lary of proximity and density which are both relational concepts;” the value of a 
resource that is collectively produced results from human activity and is contin-
gent on the ability of people to access and use the resource.103 The legal owner 
of the resource is “only able to capture the ‘unearned increment’ through cut-
ting the [resource] off from its surrounding environment and turning it into an 
isolated, tradeable object—its value results from mistakenly attributing network 
effects to the [resource] itself.”104 
Consider the case of hundreds of community gardens in previously dis-
tressed New York City neighborhoods which local officials proposed to auction 
off to private developers. These lots were left vacant by the demolition of build-
ings abandoned by their original owners. Residents cleared the lots of trash and 
drug paraphernalia, planted and cultivated plants and vegetables, and created 
 101. Id. at 997; see also Alessandra Quarta & Tomaso Ferrando, Italian Property 
Outlaws: From the Theory of the Commons to the Praxis of Occupation, 15 GLOBAL 
JURIST 261 (2015).  
 102. Christian Borch & Martin Kornberger, Introduction to URBAN COMMONS: 
RETHINKING THE CITY 6-7 (Christian Borch & Martin Kornberger eds., 2015). 
 103. Id. at 7-8. 
 104. Id. at 8. 
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safe community spaces in otherwise socially and economically fragile commu-
nities. City officials persistently characterized the land as “vacant,” stripping the 
land of its social (and economic) value to its users, and argued that in the long 
run the communities where the gardens sat would benefit from the new devel-
opment and the affordable housing that the city planned to build on some of 
the lots.105 This characterization stripped the resource of any functional value to 
the community, or to the city for that matter. Yet, by auctioning off the gardens 
the city was able to capture the “unearned increment” from the resource—the 
increase in surrounding property values resulting from the improved neighbor-
hoods106—without accounting for the inevitable dispossession and displace-
ment that ultimately resulted from gentrification of these neighborhoods. 
The utility claimed by urban residents who claim, or attempt to claim, ur-
ban land or structures as a cooperatively managed resource is linked to the idea 
that the commons is socially produced—that is, it is created, used, preserved, 
and managed by some collection of people.107 In this sense, the commons fos-
ters social relationships between the people within it, and consists of the rela-
tionship created between the users and the resource. Community and urban 
gardens are said to facilitate the development of social capital among its net-
worked participants, which in turns produces a host of other goods such as 
public safety, recreational opportunities, green space, fresh food, and other crit-
ical resources for neighborhood residents, particularly in disadvantaged neigh-
borhoods.108 As such, when community gardeners resist the taking of these gar-
dens by the city to sell them off to a private developer, they are making a 
normative claim about value or utility of the resource as it relates to the ability 
of the community to function and to flourish as a healthy, sustainable commu-
nity. 
 
4. The Social Function of Property 
 
The idea that an urban resource otherwise subject to exclusive private or 
public ownership rights should instead be claimed and utilized as a commons 
can be rooted in the “social function of property” principle found in many con-
 105. Foster, supra note 21, at 534-38 (recounting the legal struggle over the gardens). In 
the end, luxury condos and parking lots occupy any of the spaces where these lots 
stood and it is clear that the city did not have a real plan for affordable housing. Id. 
at 536 n.29; see also In re New York City Coal. for the Pres. of Gardens v. Giuliani, 
670 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 666 N.Y.S.2d 918 (App. Div. 1998). 
 106. Notably, researchers have found that property values tend to go up in 
disadvantaged communities with community gardens.Ioan Voicu & Vicki Been, 
The Effect of Community Gardens on Neighboring Property Values, 36 REAL EST. 
ECON. 241, 243 (2008). 
 107. LINEBAUGH, supra note 15, at 59 (noting that “there is no commons without 
commoning”). 
 108. See generally Foster, supra note 21, at 540-45 (reviewing the literature). 
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stitutions around the world.109 The doctrine embraces most broadly the idea 
that an owner cannot always do what she wants with her property; rather she is 
obligated to make it productive, which may include putting it at the service of 
the community.110 In other words, sometimes the state is obligated to require 
individuals to sacrifice some property rights in order to put property to its pro-
ductive and socially functional use, or to do so itself.111 
Leon Duguit, the French jurist who developed this idea in a series of lec-
tures, rooted it in a description of social reality that recognizes solidarity, or the 
interdependence between individuals in a society.112 Because individuals in soci-
ety have different needs and capacities, the social division of labor is crucial to 
ensuring the satisfaction of these needs. In order for the people and the com-
 109. See, e.g., Symposium, The Social Function of Property: A Comparative Perspective, 
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003 (2011) (including contributions from American and 
Latin American scholars exploring the doctrine’s applications in Latin America 
and comparing it with similar “social obligation” norms in American property 
law) [hereinafter Symposium]; Bailey & Mattei, supra note 98, at 981-82 
(discussing Article 42 of the Italian Constitution which provides that private 
property receive constitutional protection only as far as it serves a “social 
function” and is “accessible to everybody”); see also GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC 
LAW] Art. 14(2) (Ger.), translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch 
_gg/index.html. 
 110. The basic idea behind the social function of property is that property has internal 
limits—not just external ones—which extend to an owner’s obligation with 
respect to what she does with her property. Consequently, the state should protect 
property only when it fulfills its social function and should intervene when the 
owner is not acting in a manner consistent with her obligations. Taxation and 
expropriation are powerful tools for achieving such ends. See Sheila R. Foster & 
Daniel Bonilla, Introduction, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 1004-08 (2011) (tracing the 
idea of the social function of property to the French jurist León Duguit). 
 111. In the Italian legal scholarship, for example, “common goods” are defined as those 
goods that are “functional” to the exercise of fundamental rights and to human 
development. See, e.g., Bailey & Mattei, supra note 98, at 994 (citing the work of the 
well-known Rodotà Commission, named after a leading Italian property scholar 
and former distinguished member of Parliament; the Commission introduced the 
category of “common goods” into Italian law and defined them as goods that are 
“functional to the exercise of fundamental rights and to a free development of the 
human being”). The draft of the Civil Code reform by the Rodotà Commission 
was never passed into law. However it triggered the debate on the commons in the 
Italian legal scholarship. For an account of the different positions within the 
Commission and in the Italian legal scholarship, see Christian Iaione, Governing 
the Urban Commons, 1 ITALIAN J. PUB. L. 109 (2015). 
 112. Id. at 103; see LEÓN DUGUIT, LAS TRANSFORMACIÓNES DEL DERECHO PÚBLICO Y 
PRIVADO (1975). Some of Duguit’s works translated into English are LEÓN DUGUIT, 
LAW IN THE MODERN STATE (Frida Laski & Harold Laski trans., 1919) and Léon 
Duguit, Changes of Principle in the Field of Liberty, Contract, Liability, and Property, 
reprinted in THE PROGRESS OF CONTINENTAL LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 65 
(Layton Bartol Register & Ernest Bruncken trans., 1918). 
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munity to flourish, each individual must comply with a series of functions de-
termined by the position she occupies in society.113 For Duguit, putting property 
at the service of the community means putting it into production. The wealth 
concentrated in property cannot remain unproductive. The social consequences 
would be profoundly negative. The needs of the community members would 
certainly not be satisfied and social cohesion would be in jeopardy.114 
Although not part of the classical liberal sphere of property rights embraced 
by U.S. law, progressive property scholars have nonetheless demonstrated that 
American property law, at least at its margins, contains a similar social obliga-
tion norm.115 Gregory Alexander, who has labored the most to develop this con-
cept in American law, has argued that such a norm entails an owner’s social ob-
ligation to contribute to her community those benefits that the community 
reasonably regards as necessary for its members’ development of those human 
qualities essential to their capacity to flourish as moral agents.116 
Alexander finds scattered throughout American property doctrine exam-
ples in which private property owners are required to sacrifice their ownership 
interest in a way that comports with this social obligation norm. Importantly, 
he finds such examples in instances where neither law and economics nor clas-
sical liberal analysis can justify (or can easily justify) such sacrifices. According 
to Alexander, the thicker version of the social obligation norm is at work (or 
potentially at work) in eminent domain cases and cases adjudicating remedies 
for nuisance, both of which involve state-sanctioned forced sales of private 
property for the common good or community best interest.117 
Both the social function of property and the social obligation norm thus 
recognize the interdependence of individuals within a society and the role that 
property can play generally in promoting the common good and, more particu-
larly, in the provision of those goods that society reasonably regards as neces-
sary for human functioning and flourishing.118 The question of which goods are 
 113. Based on this functionalist description of society, Duguit challenged both the 
individualism and the metaphysical nature of the liberal right to property. Foster & 
Bonilla, supra note 110, at 1006-08 (summarizing his arguments).  
 114. His argument has nothing to do with state ownership of the means of production 
or with class struggle. Normatively, Duguit is committed only to what one might 
call the “rule of productivity.” Id. at 1007. 
 115. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American 
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009). 
 116. Id. at 774. 
 117. Id. at 775-82. He also invokes his social obligation concept to explain cases in 
which the owner is prohibited from using his or her property in some way that the 
community regards as against its collective interest—such as in the case of historic 
preservation laws, environmental regulations, and beach access rights under the 
public trust doctrine. Id. at 791-810. 
 118. Id. at 760-70 (building on the “capabilities” approach of Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum to make the case that property owners have such an obligation); see 
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necessary in a particular society to foster the capabilities necessary to function 
and flourish is one without an easy answer, and one on which scholars have 
posited various thoughtful responses.119 
We agree with Alexander and Peñalver that all societies and political com-
munities must struggle with the challenge of providing adequate opportunities 
for individuals to obtain the goods necessary to function as social beings with-
out undermining the necessary incentive for productive activities.120 Yet we also 
agree that “however the details are conceived, attention to human beings’ social 
needs pushes strongly in the direction of a state obligation to take steps to pro-
vide substantial and realistic opportunities for people to obtain the property re-
quired for them to be able to participate at some minimally acceptable level in 
the social life of the community.”121 This might require an obligation to share 
property, or at least to share surplus resources, with those lacking them so that 
the latter can develop the capabilities that are necessary to human flourishing.122 
Preventing the enclosure—through exclusive ownership rights—of re-
sources that communities are able to make productive in ways that support the 
ability of those communities to function and to flourish helps to mediate con-
testations over some urban resources. 
The urban commons is likely almost always to involve contradictory claims 
about whose interests are best served by preserving versus commodifying a par-
ticular resource, and the “commons” is probably too capacious a concept to 
completely resolve these conflicts in many cases. However, what the commons 
can do, both legally and conceptually, is stake out the claim that at least some 
socially produced common goods are as essential to communities as are water 
and air and thus should be similarly protected.123 Much in the way that the law 
restrains owners from doing harm to the natural environment, the state is justi-
fied in recognizing limits to an owner’s (private or public) right to use their 
also Foster & Bonilla, supra note 110, at 1008-11 (comparing the social obligation 
norm in American property law with the social function of property idea 
developed by French jurist León Duguit). 
 119. See Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 19, at 137-38 (noting that scholars have listed 
a number of capabilities and goods necessary for flourishing that leave ample 
room for debate). 
 120. Id. at 147. 
 121. Id. at 147-48 (also noting that “in the context of a modern post-industrial society 
like our own, this observation points in the direction of a human right to a social 
safety net that guarantees a substantial basket of resources”). 
 122. Id. at 148 (naming the capabilities they believe to facilitate human flourishing—
freedom, practical rationality, sociality, among others). 
 123. Bailey & Marcucci, supra note 99, at 398; Bailey & Mattei, supra note 98, at 996; see 
also Maria Rosaria Marella, The Constituent Assembly of the Commons, 
OPENDEMOCRACY (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-
make-it/maria-rosaria-marella/constituent-assembly-of-commons-cac. 
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property in ways that significantly harm or degrade socially produced resources 
that are difficult, if not impossible, to replace or to replenish. 
In the next Part, we will address whether our legal norms in land use and 
property would require or at least support the state’s role to limit or expand 
property protections where necessary to support urban commons claims. 
 
II. Law and the Urban Commons 
 
In the previous Part, we identified a number of urban resources and goods, 
at different scales, that can be considered a “commons.” As we explained earlier, 
the analytical traction gained by characterizing a resource or good as a com-
mons is that it opens (or re-opens) the question of how best to protect or pre-
serve the resource. Typically, the solutions offered for the protection of a com-
mon pool resource fall along the public-private binary requiring either 
exclusive state control or the use of property rights to endow individuals with 
the right incentives to utilize the resource efficiently and sustainably. In this 
Part we examine the public regulatory framework and legal doctrines that are 
most relevant to claiming, protecting, and managing the urban commons, in-
cluding governing the city itself as a commons. Understanding the limitations 
of current regulatory tools and legal doctrines which manage either individual 
common resources or the city as a common resource is crucial to understand-
ing the need for an alternative governance model, to which we turn in the fol-
lowing parts. 
 
A. Zoning and Land Use Controls 
 
As previously mentioned, zoning and land use laws exist to manage the ur-
ban commons so as to avoid the tragic conditions of overconsumption and ri-
valry. Traditional “Euclidean” zoning separates incompatible land uses and ex-
cludes harmful ones to avoid negative spillovers, or externalities, which would 
result if users were freely able to locate their firms or households wherever they 
wanted in the city commons. In the same way, zoning restrictions can control 
the kind of users allowed to consume the commons by excluding those who are 
likely to take out more than what might be considered their fair share of the 
commons and leave everyone worse off, at least fiscally.124 Through its system of 
separation and exclusion, zoning protects the commons, at various scales, by 
 124. For instance, zoning that excludes those unable to pay the level of local property 
taxes that supports the kind of public goods that the community prefers is referred 
to as “fiscal zoning.” See, e.g., EDWIN S. MILLS & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY 
OF LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES AND FINANCE: ITS RELEVANCE TO URBAN FISCAL AND 
ZONING BEHAVIOR, FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS: THE ECONOMIC 
ISSUES 1, 6-11 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975).  
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helping to create and then preserve the “character” of the city, neighborhood, 
or block.125 
Known for its controlling and exclusionary tendencies, conventional zon-
ing, and other land use laws, also fall short of being able to comprehensively 
and satisfactorily manage or govern the city commons. In the first instance, the 
openness of cities and the variety of commons within them inevitably invite ri-
valry as different users are drawn to agglomerate in cities. This seemingly mag-
netic pull, along with the strain of proximity of heterogeneous users, creates the 
pre-conditions for rivalry even in heavily regulated spaces.126 We see evidence of 
this rivalry both under conditions of regulatory slippage, in which unrestrained 
competition for collectively shared resources intensifies and the existing regula-
tory infrastructure is (or becomes) inadequate to manage this rivalry. We also 
see evidence of this failure in the literal spillover across city borders of urban 
consumption (in the form of informal housing settlements) on land that falls 
outside of the scope of zoning and land use controls. 
City officials often respond to the strain of proximity, particularly of heter-
ogenous users of the city commons, by adopting “order maintenance” policies. 
As Nicole Garnett has so well illustrated in her work, land use policies are often 
utilized in cities to control and preserve “order” by alternatively separating/
dispersing and concentrating disorderly activities, depending on the problem at 
hand.127 An example of the way in which land use rules can manage social dis-
order in city common spaces is Robert Ellickson’s proposal to more compre-
hensively regulate through zoning rules so-called “chronic street nuisances”—
e.g., annoying behavior by panhandlers, mentally ill squatters, the homeless, 
and others—that often result in a decline in the attractiveness of open urban 
space to other users.128 Ellickson’s proposal would allow a city to adopt different 
zoning codes of varying stringency to govern street behavior in public spaces. 
The idea would be to separate into distinct districts or zones incompatible clas-
ses of public users of the commons, much as zoning separates out incompatible 
land uses to avoid negative spillovers.129 
 125. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 45, 68-70 (1994) (noting how zoning “protects a neighborhood from 
encroachments by land uses inconsistent with its character”). 
 126. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 79, at 1223 (“In open access spaces thronged with 
strangers . . . free-riding is apt to afflict the informal sector.”). 
 127. NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING, AND THE 
RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA (2009). 
 128. Ellickson, supra note 79, at 1207-17. 
 129. Id. at 1220. An official map would designate Red, Yellow, and Green zones and an 
accompanying ordinance text would articulate the rules of the road that apply in 
various districts. Green zones would promise relative safety and a high level of 
strictness in regulating disruptive behavior; they would be tailored to 
accommodate the “unusually sensitive” such as school children, frail elderly, 
parents with toddlers, etc. Red zones would signal extreme caution, as disorderly 
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Order maintenance land use policies can carry tremendous costs to vulner-
able individuals and communities, as well as to individual constitutional 
rights.130 But that is not their only shortcoming as a tool for maintaining and 
governing common pool resources in socially and economically complex cities. 
More fundamentally, order maintenance policies are primarily oriented toward 
controlling negative spillovers rather than generating or capturing the positive 
benefits of urban agglomeration. In other words, much of the challenge of in-
creasing urbanization patterns is how to manage, or balance, the competing 
demands of heterogeneous users as against local government competition for 
private capital and the urban elite. Designing a land use system predominantly 
aimed at harm prevention and negative spillovers elides the challenge of how to 
create cities and communities that capture the benefits of diverse inhabitants 
who must live together and share common goods. 
It may be that, as Lee Fennell has argued in a recent article, the challenge of 
managing the city commons, and the city as a commons, is the challenge of 
“participant assembly”—how to organize city space to attract the right mix of 
actors or participants that will generate the positive spillovers—i.e., knowledge 
and cultural exchange, creativity, innovation—that result from urban agglom-
eration.131 Because we cannot rely upon markets to assemble urban participants 
optimally or to maximize the positive agglomeration benefits of urban common 
space,132 she floats the idea of using “performance zoning” as a means of favor-
ing land uses that will produce positive impacts or spillovers to a particular 
neighborhood or to the City. Such a system would set targets based on positive 
spillovers—such as knowledge sharing, long-term tenancy or occupation, de-
creased vehicle traffic, increased foot traffic, etc.—that can be captured from 
allowing certain kinds of land uses. Zoning permits would be based not on a 
particular type of land use but rather on the basis of particular targeted out-
conduct in these spaces would be most tolerated by the city; these areas essentially 
would be “safe harbors” for those who engage in disorderly conduct. Yellow zones 
would serve as “lively mixing bowl[s]” where some episodic disorder would be 
tolerated but chronic misbehavior (e.g., panhandling and bench squatting) would 
not be. Id. at 1221-22. 
 130. Ellickson acknowledges these costs, along with the risk of distributional harms on 
poor, minority neighborhoods given the uneven political power of urban 
neighborhoods. Id. at 1244-46. 
 131. Fennell, supra note 28, at 1373 (“[P]rime urban space for generating agglomeration 
benefits would be matched to its most valuable use, taking into account the 
congestion impacts inflicted and suffered by that use.”).  
 132. Markets cannot reliably “assemble” urban participants to channel these goods to 
their highest valuers—or optimal agglomerations—given the potential mismatch 
between “the privately owned element (access to a given location) and the 
commonly owned one (the overall urban atmosphere).” Id. at 1394; see also id. 
(“[T]he characteristics that cause particular economic actors to derive the most 
value from a given location may or may not be the same characteristics that would 
lead them to contribute the most value to that location.”). 
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comes using performance metrics by which the positive impacts of that land use 
on communities can be assessed.133 
Performance zoning, incentive zoning, inclusionary zoning and similar 
regulatory mechanisms illustrate that land use regulation is flexible enough to 
allow for, and even privilege, the use of urban land or property as a means of 
protecting, producing and sharing common goods. Moreover, as local govern-
ments have moved away over time from binding comprehensive plans to ad hoc 
bargaining and dealing with developers,134 it is theoretically possible to strike 
negotiated arrangements to allow particular parcels or properties to transition 
to another kind of use consistent with a commons. 
However, there is a real question, and healthy skepticism, about the will-
ingness of local officials to use the zoning and land use process to recognize 
claims to the urban commons or to protect existing common pool resources of 
fragile communities. The reigning account of the politics of urban land use de-
cisions, the “growth machine” account, situates land use officials as acting in 
concert with an elite coalition of developers and real estate interests primarily 
concerned with economic growth.135 As such, if given a choice between preserv-
ing or claiming a common pool resource or selling that resource on the market 
for economic gain, most often city officials and governments will yield to the 
latter pressure.136 
Growth machine politics may not be a given in every zoning and land use 
decision, to be sure, and the inclination to pursue urban growth machine poli-
cies at all costs may even be on the wane in some cities.137 Nevertheless, it is fair 
 133. Thus, for example, zoning might specify that uses locating in the area have a 
certain minimum average number of employees on site each workday or consume 
meals in the immediate area, encouraging interaction between workers. Id. at 1411. 
The author also notes that some communities have attempted to use zoning and 
other land use controls to restrict residential occupancy to those who will be 
present on a relatively long-term basis, to encourage the formation of social ties 
and avoid high turnover in communities. Id. at 1411-12.  
 134. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of 
Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 849-50 (1983); see also Mun. Art. Soc’y of 
N.Y., Zoning Variances and the New York City Board of Standards and Appeals, 30 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 193, 196 (2005) (noting shift over thirty-year period from 
“bulk” to “use” variances, which permit, for example, residential units in 
manufacturing zones; also noting that the frequency of these variances has meant 
that zoning boards have essentially taken on a planning role theoretically reserved 
for the City Planning Commission). 
 135. See supra notes 39 & 40.  
 136. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 21, at 534-38 (recounting a dispute in New York City 
involving the city’s decision to sell to private developers hundreds of community 
gardens and the failed effort of neighborhood gardeners and residents to stop the 
auctioning off of the gardens). 
 137. Been et al., supra note 40 (examining rezoning during the Bloomberg 
administration and finding that the city downzoned a higher percentage of its lots 
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to say that the politics and process of zoning and land use decision making does 
not favor, and likely cuts against, efforts to protect from the market those urban 
resources that residents want to claim or retain as a common pool resource. 
Where this is the case, the question is whether legal doctrine offers any means of 
identifying and/or protecting urban common pool resources as a matter of 
property law. 
 
B. Public Trust Protection 
 
The public trust doctrine, in which the title to the property is vested in the 
state to hold in perpetuity for the public, is presumed to apply to environmen-
tally sensitive lakes, rivers and wetlands.138 However, the doctrine’s origins were 
not only in the protection of natural resources, but also in their urban equiva-
lents—namely, city streets, public squares, roadways and the like—which courts 
routinely protected against the pressure to legislatively appropriate or devote to 
nonpublic purposes during an era of intense industrialization.139 Thus, in the 
19th century, either as a matter of statute or common law, courts deemed some 
aspects of the urban commons to be public trust property and as such provided 
protection under the public trust doctrine, with strict limits on its alienation 
and use of purposes other than those open and accessible to the public.140 
than would be expected under a growth machine hypothesis, results that support 
strong attention to the interests of homeowners who are more likely to support 
land uses that improve the quality of life for residents, including the provision of 
public amenities and other public goods, and that are in tension with the goals of 
the growth machine). 
 138. See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: 
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). 
 139. See, e.g., MOLLY SELVIN, THIS TENDER AND DELICATE BUSINESS: THE PUBLIC TRUST 
DOCTRINE IN AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY, 1789-1920, at 102 (Harold 
Hyman et al. eds., 1987) (stating that the impetus for the assertion of public rights 
in early nineteenth century courts was industrialization; namely, “[a]s railroad and 
shipping improved during the century, control of harbor-front property in 
particular and urban property in general came to mean control of the economic 
destiny of a particular locality”); Ivan Kaplan, Does the Privatization of Publicly 
Owned Infrastructure Implicate the Public Trust Doctrine? Illinois Central and the 
Chicago Parking Meter Concession Agreement, 7 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 136, 148-55 
(2012) (reviewing the history). 
 140. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 139, at 153 (noting that “in the late nineteenth century, 
state supreme courts, and the United States Supreme Court, began to invalidate 
legislative appropriations of public trust property;” specifically, many courts 
“invoked public trust principles to rescind legislative grants for the construction 
and operation of elevated, for-profit railroads on public streets”); see also 
Merriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 513 (1880) (“In its streets, wharves, 
cemeteries, hospitals, court-houses, and other public buildings, the [municipal] 
corporation has no proprietary rights distinct from the trust for the public. It 
holds them for public use, and to no other use can they be appropriated without 
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The public trust doctrine is no longer routinely applied to city streets or 
public squares in American courts. In fact, most modern courts and commenta-
tors consider the doctrine to be effectively confined to natural resources having 
some nexus with navigable waters, although many states have extended the doc-
trine beyond water-based resources.141 Nevertheless, there are some states that 
explicitly protect public parks and/or city streets under the public trust doc-
trine, invoking the doctrine in order to prevent local officials from appropriat-
ing or exploiting those resources for non-public uses.142 Some historic struc-
tures and landmarks, for example, are also considered to be held in public trust, 
usually by legislation, and protected from alienation and destruction.143 
Even where courts or legislatures do not explicitly extend the public trust 
doctrine to parks, streets, and other open access urban resources, land can be 
special legislative sanction. It would be a perversion of that trust to apply them to 
other uses. The courts can have nothing to do with them, unless appealed to on 
behalf of the public to prevent their diversion from the public use.”). 
 141. See generally Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights 
and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 719-27 (2006). 
 142. See e.g., Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1053-
54 (N.Y. 2001) (“[O]ur courts have time and again reaffirmed the principle that 
parkland is impressed with a public trust, requiring legislative approval before it 
can be alienated or used for an extended period for non-park purposes.”); AT&T 
Co. v. Arlington Heights, 156 Ill.2d 399, 409 (1993) (rejecting the efforts of two 
home-rule municipalities to profit by renting or leasing land beneath city streets to 
a telecommunications provider and holding that “municipalities do not possess 
proprietary powers over the public streets. They only possess regulatory powers. 
The public streets are held in trust for the use of the public”). But see Fencl v. City 
of Harpers Ferry, 620 N.W.2d 808, 814 (Iowa 2000) (“We think these 
underpinnings of the public trust doctrine have no applicability to public streets 
and alleys. Simply stated, an alley is not a natural resource.”). 
 143. See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-19a (providing that historic structures are 
protected from unreasonable destruction and that to gain protection plaintiff 
must demonstrate “that the conduct of the defendant, acting alone or in 
combination with others, has or is likely unreasonably to destroy the public trust 
in such historic structures . . . .”); Hill/City Point v. City of New Haven, 2000 WL 
1172327, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000) (stating “plaintiff has shown, prima facie, 
that the defendants’ conduct is likely unreasonably to destroy the public trust in a 
historic structure or landmark; however, defendants have established the 
affirmative defense that considering all the relevant surrounding circumstances 
and factors, there are no feasible and prudent alternatives to the demolition given 
the condition of the building and the amount of repair it needs”); Harris Mem’l 
Church v. Bridgeport Redevelopment Agency, No. CV000370421, 2000 WL 
33115390, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2000) (“In the present case, the church 
has failed to show that the taking of the church property and the razing of the 
structure would be an unreasonable destruction of the public trust in the 
building.”). 
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“dedicated” as such either expressly, through legislation or private deed,144 or 
implicitly, through the actions of a municipality or the commonly accepted use 
of the land.145 Courts have held that once a park or other open access urban re-
source has been either explicitly or implicitly dedicated, and particularly where 
there is reliance on that dedication, a public trust is created and the city is re-
stricted from alienating or appropriating the property for non-public purpos-
es.146 An example of an implicit dedication is Chicago’s Grant Park, along Lake 
Michigan, which was formed by way of a city map which designated the space a 
 144. See, e.g., 1996 N.Y. Op. Atty. Gen. (Inf.) 1093 (asserting that village board may act 
by resolution or by local law to dedicate a parcel as parkland). See also Friends of 
N. Spokane Cty. Parks v. Spokane Cty., 184 Wash. App. 105, 129 (2014) (dedication 
of lands is “the devotion of property to a public use by an unequivocal act of the 
owner” such as through a will or deed). 
 145. Either way, the actions demonstrate that the government considers the land to be 
parkland or that the public used it as a park. Examples include: a municipality 
publicly announcing its intention to purchase the lands specifically for use as a 
park, including by placing parkland in a publicly recorded master plan or map, or 
constructing recreational facilities, among other ways. See, e.g., Kenny v. Bd. of Tr. 
of Vill. of Garden City, 735 N.Y.S.2d 606, 607 (App. Div. 2d 2001) (finding that 
property acquired for recreational purposes and used for recreation was instilled 
with public trust even though never officially dedicated). Dedication through 
implication can also occur when the common and accepted use of the land is as a 
park. See, e.g., Riverview Partners v. City of Peekskill, 710 N.Y.S.2d 601 (App. Div. 
1st 2000) (finding implied dedication due to evidence showing property was 
purchased for park purposes, named “Fort Hill Park” on maps and sign at 
entrance, and used as a park by the public since it was purchased); Vill. of Croton-
on-Hudson v. Westchester Cty., 331 N.Y.S.2d 883, 884 (App. Div. 2d 1972) (“While 
the deeds into the county are in fee and contain no restriction of the land to park 
use and while there does not appear to have been a formal dedication of the land 
to such use . . . we think the long-continued use of the land for park purposes 
constitutes a dedication and acceptance by implication.”). But see Pearlman v. 
Anderson, 307 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1016-17 (Sup. Ct. 1970), aff’d, 314 N.Y.S.2d 173 (App. 
Div. 2d 1970) (finding that portion of property purchased for general purposes but 
which may have been used as a park, the proof of which was not convincing to the 
court, did not require legislative approval for other public use). 
 146. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ryerss, 2008 WL 4824437, at *10 (Pa. Com. Pl. Aug. 25, 
2008) (“Under long-standing Pennsylvania Common Law a public trust is created 
where a city by ordinance dedicates land to be used as a public park and then in 
reliance on that dedication, funds are appropriate by the state, city and individuals 
to improve and maintain that land.”); see also Bd. of Tr. of Phila. Museums v. Tr. 
of the Univ. of Pa., 251 Pa. 115, 123-25 (1915) (stating that the “city holds, subject to 
the trusts, in favor of the community and is but the conservator of the title in the 
soil and has neither power nor authority to sell and convey the same for private 
purposes”). 
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“public ground for ever to remain vacant of buildings.”147 This map, along with 
representations by local officials, formed the backbone of public dedication liti-
gation by owners of property abutting the park.148 
In a historical account of the public dedication litigation involving Grant 
Park, Joseph Kearny and Thomas Merrill recount how Aaron Montgomery 
Ward, the famous Chicago catalog merchant, was able to block construction of 
a variety of structures in the park in a series of actions from 1890 to 1910.149 He 
did so by convincing Illinois courts that that map created a public dedication of 
the land and that, as an abutting property owner, he had standing to secure an 
injunction against development projects that violated the dedication. Subse-
quently, “in the wake of Ward’s victories, the public dedication doctrine was 
wielded by generations of Michigan Avenue landowners to fend off construc-
tion of public buildings in what became a 319-acre park.”150 The precedents es-
tablished by Ward demonstrate how much power abutting property owners can 
have over public lands, even in cases where the general public desires develop-
ment or other activities on that land.151 
 147. Joseph D. Kearny & Thomas W. Merrill, Private Rights in Public Lands: The 
Chicago Lakefront, Montgomery Ward, and the Public Dedication Doctrine, 105 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1417, 1426 (2011). 
 148. The land abutting the Park was sold at a premium based on representations that it 
would remain an open public space, and on the understanding that prospective 
purchasers would enjoy direct exposure to Lake Michigan. See id. at 1425-27 (also 
noting that there were no other legal restrictions on how land along the lakefront 
would be used and that Chicago had not adopted a zoning ordinance during this 
period). 
 149. While Ward enjoined nearly all construction in Grant Park, he did consent to the 
construction of a temporary post office in 1895. See id. at 1476. 
 150. Id. at 1419. Although, as they note, by the dawn of the twenty-first century, local 
officials and private donors had succeeded in building in Grant Park. “Millennial 
Park,” as it is now known, now resides in the northwest corner of the park, after 
the city obtained consents to its construction from owners of property abutting 
the northwest corner of Grant Park. These consents were held by a state court 
judge, in an unpublished order, to be an effective waiver of the public dedication. 
Id. at 1419 (citing Boaz v. City of Chicago, No. 99L-3804 (Cook Cty., Ill. Cic. Ct. 
Jan. 14, 2000)). 
 151. Of course, the danger, as Kearny and Merrill note, is that the incentives of 
abutting property owners and the general public will not align and that there 
might arguably be “overprotection” of public space. See id. at 1421. They argue: 
On the largest question—whether to maintain a public space or permit it to be 
privatized—there is likely to be a convergence of interests. But on subsidiary 
issues, abutting landowners may harbor very different preferences about how to 
manage public spaces. To simplify, abutting owners are likely to prefer peace and 
quiet, whereas the general public may want fun and games. As we have seen, 
Michigan Avenue owners tended to oppose baseball stadiums, toboggan slides, 
armories used as venues for prize fights, circuses, political conventions held in 
wigwams, and pavilions for outdoor concerts. It is likely that a public referendum 
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What is interesting for our purposes about this history, and the ensuing 
doctrinal developments, are the rules of standing that recognize the role of ur-
ban inhabitants in protecting open-access common resources from incompati-
ble uses, sale or destruction. As Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have 
argued, one reason to grant such “antiproperty” rights to some members of the 
public is that parks and other open spaces are vulnerable to the whims of local 
governments who are captured by interest groups seeking development oppor-
tunities.152 The Ward precedents applying the public dedication doctrine in 
Chicago to allow abutting property owners veto rights over development on 
public lands replicates Bell and Parchomovsky’s “antiproperty” proposal. 153 
Much like their proposal, the holders of these veto rights (e.g. abutting property 
owners) are able to exercise these vetoes because the cost of achieving unani-
mous consent among them, particularly if they are numerous, are too high.154 
Thus, property owners are able to halt development and other activities, effec-
tively freezing public spaces in their current, open-space state. 
While intuitively appealing for purposes of endowing citizens with the abil-
ity to protect the open “interaction space” that renders public spaces so valua-
ble, and which facilitates a host of other goods that are made possible by the 
non-excludability of the space, there are real costs to endowing citizens with 
these kinds of veto rights. For instance, the problem with the Ward precedents, 
as others have pointed out, is that the right of Ward (and others) to block de-
velopment in Grant Park was premised on his private right to open space and to 
an unobstructed view of Lake Michigan.155 As Kearny and Merrill note, the pub-
lic dedication line of cases reflects a peculiar hybrid doctrine which grants pri-
vate rights in public spaces based on the reliance interests of those who pur-
chased land—typically at higher prices—on the understanding that adjacent 
land would remain subject to public use.156 The danger is that these property 
would yield different views on these activities. Ward, who became the park’s most 
important enforcement agent, may have harbored even more negative views about 
public gatherings than most abutting owners. 
  Id. at 1526. 
 152. They proposed as a solution that private property owners who benefit 
disproportionately from parks and similar resources should be given veto power 
over any proposal to develop these resources. See Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2003). 
 153. Kearny & Merrill, supra note 147, at 1421. 
 154. See id. at 1512 (noting that the public dedication doctrine is a “unanimous consent 
mechanism”; “any abutting landowner can block a forbidden use, provided that 
he or she is willing to incur the expense of a lawsuit. But if all abutting owners 
consent to a use, the project can go forward, even if it would otherwise violate the 
dedication”). 
 155. Allison Dunham, The Chicago Lakefront and a Montgomery Ward, 25 U. CHI. L. 
SCH. REC. 11, 17 (1979). 
 156. Kearny & Merrill, supra note 147, at 1445-49. 
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owners can act solely in their self-interest, without any democratic check, and in 
ways that are not clearly in the public interest or even for the benefit of the par-
ticular public space.157 
It is not at all clear from the public trust and public dedication doctrines, 
both developed by American courts in the nineteenth century, whether mem-
bers of the public have any legally recognizable interest in open public spaces or 
other common pool resources that have become contested or subject to rivalry. 
Because the public trust doctrine is of such limited scope in the type of re-
sources that it covers, even its liberal standing rules, which allow any citizen 
taxpayer to intervene in decisions about public resources,158 will not provide a 
means to stop local officials from selling off community gardens or urban farms 
or underutilized structures to private developers. These clearly are outside of 
the scope of public trust properties even under the most expansive interpreta-
tion of the public trust doctrine in the urban context. 
Similarly, even though the public dedication doctrine covers a wider scope 
of urban commons or public goods—such as streets, parks, squares, and any 
other any other land that has been explicitly or implicitly dedicated—its stand-
ing rules are limited in such a way that they do not give members of the public 
veto power over non-conforming activity absent proof of some special injury or 
interest.159 Moreover, the public dedication doctrine has long been on the wane 
 157. See id. at 18 (noting that after twenty years of litigation and expenditures of an 
estimated $50,000, Ward had successfully prevented all civic projects for buildings 
in Grant Park and had done this in spite of the almost unanimous opposition of 
the newspapers and civic leaders of Chicago; also noting that it is difficult to say 
what the general citizenry thought given the absence of public opinion surveys 
back then); see also Kearny & Merrill, supra note 147, at 1421 (noting that Ward’s 
adamant refusal to allow the Field Museum of Natural History and erection of 
pavilions for summer concerts in Grant Park was likely inconsistent with what 
most persons in Chicago wanted). 
 158. See, e.g., Friends of N. Spokane Cty. Parks v. Spokane Cty., 184 Wash. App. 105, 124 
(2014). Although in some states taxpayers can only bring suit where the Attorney 
General refused to bring a case or act in the public interest. See, e.g., id. at 121-22. 
 159. See Kearny & Merrill, supra note 147, at 1522-26 (comparing the public trust and 
public dedication doctrines, including their standing rules). As a general rule, for 
citizens to bring suit, an individual must have a special injury different from the 
general public or special interest in the trust or dedication. However, each 
jurisdiction differs in what this means. See In re In re Estate of Ryerss, 2008 WL 
4824437, at *8 (Pa. Com. Pl. Aug. 25, 2008) (allowing taxpayer standing on the 
basis of “a joint nexus of settlor intent and financial contribution”); Citizens for 
Pres. of Buehler Park v. City of Rolla, 187 S.W.3d 359, 362 (Mo. App. S.D. 2006) 
(taxpayers must assert that government funds were or may be illegally expensed in 
order to assert standing); Hinton v. City of St. Joseph, 889 S.W.2d 854, 859 (Mo. 
App. W.D. 1994) (stating that nearby landowners have standing but only if they 
can assert “special injury” beyond property values); Spokane, 184 Wash. App. at 122 
(stating that taxpayers must first petition the Attorney General). 
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and thus is unlikely to be a viable tool for protecting public spaces and other 
urban common pool resources.160 
 
C. Eminent Domain 
 
The power of state and local governments to take property, with compensa-
tion, has recently been enlarged through the Supreme Court’s expansive inter-
pretation of “public use” in Kelo v. City of New London.161 Before Kelo, the pow-
er of the government to take property was arguably limited to an anti-harm 
principle in which public use was interpreted more narrowly to allow takings 
only for the purposes of curing social and economic harms such as “blight” or a 
land oligopoly.162 Kelo, however, makes clear that the government can exercise 
its power of eminent domain in the name of economic revitalization so long as 
the taking is part of a “carefully considered” redevelopment plan and not an 
outright property transfer from one private party to another.163 Some states 
have since limited the reach of Kelo, but the jurisprudential signal from the case 
is quite clear: state and local governments may define public use in ways that 
are utility maximizing—that is, property may be taken for a higher economic 
use even if neither the property nor the surrounding area is blighted or other-
wise in poor condition. 
In some ways, this expansive use of eminent domain maps onto a version 
of the social function of property doctrine and social obligation norm. Recall 
that both the doctrine and the norm recognize the idea of “social solidarity”—
the interdependence of individuals in a society—and the need to put property 
to productive use in the service of the common good. The social function of 
property and social obligation norm has much plasticity, both in theory and in 
practice.164 It can be read in its thinnest version to entail an obligation of prop-
 160. See Kearny & Merrill, supra note 147, at 1518-22 (explaining its decline since the 
Ward cases in Illinois). 
 161. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 162. See, e.g., id. at 494-504 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority 
opinion extended the meaning of public use by eliminating the need to show the 
types of affirmative social harms that provided basis for finding public use in 
Berman and Midkiff; in both cases, the legislative body had found that eliminating 
existing property use was necessary to remedy harm and a public purpose was 
realized only when the harmful use was eliminated); see also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. 
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34-36 (1954). 
 163. Importantly, as Justice Kennedy highlighted in his concurrence, the “identities of 
most of the private beneficiaries were unknown at the time the city formulated its 
plans.” Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 164. The idea that property owners owe affirmative obligations to the welfare of others, 
and to societal welfare more generally, can satisfy a number of different ideological 
orientations, including a classical liberal one as a recent symposium on the various 
interpretations and applications of the doctrine in Latin America demonstrate. See 
generally Symposium, supra note 109 (noting that in some Latin American 
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erty owners to contribute, through taxation, to the provision of public goods—
such as law enforcement, schools, and fire protection165—or to entail an obliga-
tion to curtail an owner’s dominion over his property in the presence of market 
failures (such as free riders and holdouts) in order to promote and maximize 
public welfare.166 At its thickest, as Greg Alexander argues, it can be read to re-
quire the use of property to contribute benefits and goods that the community 
reasonably regards as necessary for its members’ development of those human 
qualities essential to their capacity to flourish as moral agents.167 
Eminent domain can be a means to putting property to its social func-
tion—or productive use—either in the thin or thick version of the norm. For 
instance, eminent domain has often been justified on the grounds that allowing 
the government to acquire private property under certain circumstances pro-
duces the most economically efficient result for taxpayers.168 As such, taking 
property to promote economic development is justifiable if done to put the 
property or properties to a socially desirable and economically productive use 
that will benefit taxpayers. Eminent domain allows the government to avoid the 
holdout problem that is said to plague land assembly, thereby avoiding the trag-
edy of the anticommons—the wasteful underutilization of property caused by 
too many entitlement holders.169 
Under a thick version of the social function of property, or social obligation 
norm, eminent domain can be utilized to provide those benefits and goods that 
society reasonably regards as necessary for human flourishing. As Lisa Alexan-
der has recently documented, a number of organized groups and residents 
across the country that have occupied foreclosed or abandoned homes and va-
cant land are convincing local governments to use eminent domain to transfer 
title of the under-utilized properties to community-controlled land trusts.170 Al-
lowing the community to manage these properties as a common pool resource 
would keep these homes perpetually affordable to low- and moderate-income 
countries, courts have interpreted the doctrine to impose internal limits on the 
right to property, more in line with a thicker version of the doctrine, but other 
countries have not interpreted to impose external but not internal limits to the 
right). 
 165. Alexander, supra note 115, at 753-57. 
 166. See, e.g., id. at 753; Hanoch Dagan, The Social Responsibility of Ownership, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1259 (2007). 
 167. See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text. 
 168. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 55-56 (6th ed. 2003); 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 81-82 
(1986). 
 169. Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1467 (2008) 
(noting that, from an efficiency standpoint, eminent domain is necessary to 
consolidate urban land that is overly fragmented into unusably small parcels). 
 170. Alexander, supra note 90. 
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households and provide other common goods, such as green space, important 
for human flourishing in these communities. 
In some instances, both the thick and thin version of the social obligation 
norm can be put to work, as when eminent domain is used to overcome land 
assembly problems in the context of providing common goods necessary for 
human flourishing. Consider the example of the Dudley Street Neighborhood 
Initiative (DSNI), a group of citizens who formed a nonprofit community or-
ganization to revitalize their neighborhood, one of the poorest and most deso-
late in Boston, enabled by the city’s delegation of authority to the group to exer-
cise the power of eminent domain to assemble land for an “urban village”—
consisting of affordable housing, shopping, open green space (“a town com-
mon”), and a community center.171 
Like many residents in distressed neighborhoods, Dudley Street residents 
cleaned up many of the vacant lots that littered their neighborhood. However, 
in order to realize its plan of an “urban village, DSNI needed control over the 
future use of the fifteen acres of vacant lots owned by the city and the fifteen 
acres that were privately owned, most of which had municipal tax liens against 
them or were in foreclosure. DSNI convinced the city to declare a moratorium 
on the transfer of city-owned vacant lots in the neighborhood. The privately 
owned vacant lots were another matter, however. DSNI knew that foreclosing 
on each of the scattered individual private properties would be too time con-
suming, and instead persuaded the city to grant its newly established affiliate, 
Dudley Neighbors Inc. (DNI) status as an “urban redevelopment corporation,” 
giving it the power to acquire by eminent domain vacant land within the Dud-
ley Triangle. 
Subsequently, DNI was set up as a land trust to acquire the vacant lots and 
oversee the development of affordable housing as well as community facilities 
and open space on the land that was formerly constituted of fragmented vacant 
lots.172 With the help of additional private and public funding, including a fed-
eral Housing and Urban Development (HUD) grant (secured with the help of 
the City), DSNI/DNI ultimately acquired about twenty-eight of the original 
thirty acres of vacant land in the Dudley Triangle and has steered the develop-
ment of hundreds of permanently affordable housing units, six public green 
common spaces, two community centers, an urban farm, refurbished 
schoolyards, and numerous playgrounds. 
 171. See generally PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND RISE 
OF AN URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD 128-39 (1994) (describing DSNI and the history of 
the Dudley Street neighborhood); Elizabeth A. Taylor, The Dudley Street 
Neighborhood Initiative and the Power of Eminent Domain, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1061 
(1995). 
 172. DSNI/DNI became the first community group in the nation to win the right of 
eminent domain. Under Massachusetts law, only the Boston Redevelopment 
Authority (BRA) or an “urban redevelopment corporation” authorized by the 
BRA to undertake a redevelopment project was authorized to exercise the right of 
eminent domain. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 121A, § 7A (2011). 
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The City’s use of its eminent domain power to support a community of ac-
tive citizens making a claim to vacant land as a common pool resource, then 
acting as a steward of the resource and collaboratively managing it as a com-
mons for future generations, is an example of the State as a facilitator or enabler 
in governance of the commons. As we will explore in the next Part, part of the 
importance of naming and claiming as a “commons” certain resources in the 
city is that it raises anew the question of how best to manage and govern re-
sources in which citizens have a common stake in ways that are not subject to 
the whims of a neoliberal state nor to the vagaries of the market. 
 
III. Governing the Urban Commons 
 
The commons, as we have said, is partly a question of resource characteri-
zation and partly a question of governance. This is why both Hardin’s Tragedy 
of the Commons and Ostrom’s Governing the Commons wrestle with how best to 
manage resources that are (or should be) shared by unaffiliated users who may 
have their own selfish or utility-maximizing interests in consuming those re-
sources. We have seen that the city and much of its land and other resources are 
partly managed through a public regulatory system in which the city places lim-
its, through its zoning and land use laws, on the location decisions of individu-
als and firms as a means of controlling negative spillovers from those decisions. 
The city may also use zoning and land use tools such as performance zoning 
and inclusive zoning to structure incentives for sharing the city and for ensur-
ing that a broader group of inhabitants can access and use the city commons. 
Moreover, the city might also allow the full or partial enclosure, or privatiza-
tion, of some of the open resources, or commons, in the city in order to ensure 
their sustainability.173 
The emergence of user-managed, but not user-owned, resources represents 
a third way that cities have allowed urban common pool resources to be gov-
erned. This third way is consistent with Ostrom’s work, which demonstrated, in 
opposition to Hardin’s Tragedy scenario, that even self-interested resource users 
can and do successfully manage their land, water, forests, and fisheries without 
the coercive hand of the state and without privatizing the resource. Ostrom fo-
cused on the concept of local empowerment: under certain conditions local 
communities can autonomously decide on and enforce the rules for sharing and 
 173. Privatized neighborhoods, streets, and parks are some examples of the 
privatization of common goods in the city which allow resident users to set usage 
rules and take over full responsibility for maintenance. See, e.g., Michelle 
Hofmann, When Residents Own the Streets, L.A. TIMES (May 14, 2006) http:// 
articles.latimes.com/2006/may/14/realestate/re-private14; Mike MacLaughlin, 
Parking Dream: Residents Can Set Parking and Traffic Rules on City’s More Than 
900 Private Streets, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.nydailynews 
.com/new-york/parking-dream-residents-set-parking-traffic-rules-city-900-
private-streets-article-1.203563. See also ROBERT H. NELSON, PRIVATE 
NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 265-73 
(2005). 
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managing common pool resources, in the process developing and maintaining 
self-governing institutions.174 
 
A. Existing Urban Commons Institutions 
 
In user-managed scenarios, individuals exist in an interdependent relation-
ship with each other and with the resource, and are strongly motivated to over-
come collective action problems, collaboratively manage the resource, and en-
hance their productivity over time.175 In many of these cases, users are able to 
enforce and monitor their rules only with the help of external state agencies on 
whom they rely in instituting a complex, “nested” governance system to regu-
late the resource but without subsuming these institutions into a centralized 
governance regime.176 
As we have written before, there are some urban commons-based institu-
tions—e.g. business improvement districts, park conservancies, community 
gardens, and neighborhood foot patrols—that resemble Ostrom’s governance 
examples177 These institutions allow users to manage open-access resources but 
without transferring ownership of the resource or the ultimate policymaking 
authority to private parties.178 They are all born out of a group of neighborhood 
or city residents who desire to maintain an open-access commons and who are 
willing to contribute to the restoration, maintenance, and preservation of that 
commons. Many of these efforts are a response to the failure of local govern-
 174. Ostrom’s study focused on small-scale resources affecting a relatively small 
number of persons (fifty to 15,000) who are heavily dependent on the resource for 
economic returns. See OSTROM, supra note 17, at 26. 
 175. See id. at 90; see also Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social 
Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 137, 149-53 (2000) (describing how collective action and 
monitoring problems are solved in a reinforcing manner when users of resources 
design their own rules that are enforced by local users or accountable to them, 
using graduated sanctions, that define who has rights to withdraw from the 
resources, and that effectively assign costs proportionate to benefits). 
 176. In contrast to self-managed community resource use systems that operate mainly 
with social sanctions, resources that traverse many communities and user groups 
may require more complex institutional structures, often involving government 
coordination and enforcement. See ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND 
COMMON-POOL RESOURCES 326 (1994) (“Individuals in relatively simple systems 
are apt to develop rules more nearly optimal than individuals in more complex 
systems, especially systems involving substantial asymmetries of interest.”). 
 177. Foster, supra note 28, at 91-108. 
 178. That is, the local government and public officials retain the power to set policies 
regarding access to, and use of, the resource. Collective management regimes lack 
the power to tax or impose fees on users of the resource, limit access to the 
resource, or impose health or other safety standards on users of the resource. See 
id. at 110. 
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ments to actively manage and fund common pool resources, leaving them sub-
ject to rivalry and degradation. 
While some of these groups operate only as an informal collection of vol-
unteers, others have become more formalized. The more formal groups estab-
lish themselves as a membership organization, elect boards of directors, write 
bylaws, and apply for nonprofit status. Both formal and non-formal groups 
alike rely to some extent on the local government to facilitate or enable their ac-
tivities in managing and governing the commons. In this sense, they are “nest-
ed” governance regimes that “claim” the urban resource as an open-access 
common resource, allowing some class of users to work cooperatively and col-
laboratively to care for and manage it.179 
The manner in which some urban commons are being user-managed with 
active support of the local government is a model that we believe can be repli-
cated for other kinds of urban commons, and even scaled up to the city itself. In 
the next Part, we want to step back and propose that there exist democratic de-
sign principles that characterize these efforts and that can be replicated in a va-
riety of formats and institutional structures. Only after setting out these princi-
ples can we imagine what it might look like to scale up to the city level these 
collaborative, polycentric forms of commons governance. 
 
B. Urban Commons as Democratic Innovation 
 
Existing commons institutions share a number of characteristics that set 
them apart from merely sublocal forms of urban governance.180 In this Part we 
describe these characteristics as: horizontal subsidiarity (or sharing), collabora-
tion, and polycentricism. We offer them as design principles that can guide the 
scaling-up of cooperative forms of commons governance to the city level. 
 
1. Horizontal Subsidiarity 
 
As existing commons institutions illustrate, subsidiarity is a first possible 
design feature for urban commons governance. Subsidiarity is the idea that 
power should be shared with “the lowest practicable tier of social organization, 
 179. Some refer to the activities of managing a commons as “commoning.” See, e.g., 
What is Commoning Anyway? Activating the Power of Social Cooperation to Get 
Things Done and Bring Us Together, ON THE COMMONS MAG. (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://www.onthecommons.org/work/what-commoning-anyway (“[C]ommoning 
represents a new way for everyday citizens to make decisions and take action to 
shape the future of their communities without being locked into the profit-driven 
mechanics of the market or being solely dependent on government agencies for 
funding.”). 
 180. See Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323 (2014) (arguing that small 
subsets of local residents, or “micro-local” units, make decisions that affect the 
public; these includes many one-off decisions such as the location of bicycle lanes, 
neighborhood school closings, historic district designation, etc.). 
326 
 
Foster Iaione FINAL COPY.docx (Do Not Delete) 7/29/2016  4:57 PM 
THE CITY AS A COMMONS  
public or private.”181 In particular, we are interested in the principle of “hori-
zontal subsidiarity,” a principle that we borrow from the 2001 reform of the 
Italian constitution which effectuated a significant change in local government 
power and the relationship between citizens and their local governments.182 
This principle of “horizontal subsidiarity” dictates that powers, where possible, 
be assigned on the basis of the local/nonlocal dimension of the collective inter-
est and of the capability of the actors to fulfill such interest.183 The reform also 
requires the promotion of “the autonomous initiatives of citizens, both as indi-
viduals and as members of associations, relating to activities of general interest, 
on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity.”184 
The principle of horizontal subsidiarity represents the foundation, we be-
lieve, of innovative, bottom-up strategies to care for, regenerate, and manage 
urban common pool resources. The principle of horizontal subsidiarity concep-
tualizes the citizen as an active citizen and encourages local officials to put in 
place appropriate public policies that foster the activation and empowerment of 
citizens in managing and caring for shared resources.185 Active citizenship 
means that urban inhabitants are able to participate not only in the public life 
of the city, but also in creating the city and in maintaining it for the collective 
welfare. This can range from maintaining streets, to taking care of public 
 181. Roderick M. Hills, Is Federalism Good for Localism?, 21 J. L. & POL. 187, 190 (2005). 
 182. See Gian Franco Cartei & Vincenzo Ferraro, Reform Of The Fifth Title Of Italian 
Constitution: A Step Towards A Federal System?, 8 EUR. PUB. L. 445 (2002); Erminio 
Ferrari, Planning, Building And Environmental Law After The Recent Italian 
Devolution, 8 EUR. PUB. L. 357 (2002). 
 183. The reforms place on equal footing, albeit with different powers, all the sub-
national levels of government and the entities composing the Italian Republic. 
Article 114 of the revised constitutional text states that “the Republic is composed 
of municipalities, metropolitan cities, provinces, regions and the State.” Art. 114 
Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). The previous text, instead, stated: “the Republic is 
divided into regions, provinces and municipalities.” Article 114 now also extends 
to provinces, metropolitan cities and municipalities the legal status previously 
granted only to regions by the repealed Article 115. Id. Accordingly, they share with 
regions the same nature of autonomous entities with their own home rules and 
constitutionally entrenched powers and functions. Indeed, they are “autonomous 
entities having their own statutes, powers and functions in accordance with the 
principles laid down in the Constitution.” Id. The text of the Italian Constitution 
is available at CONSTITUTION OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC, http://www.senato.it/ 
documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf (last visited June 4, 
2016) (current Italian Constitution). For the purpose of comparison, the text of 
the pre-amendment Italian Constitution is available at THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ITALIAN REPUBLIC, http://legalportal.am/download/constitutions/110_en.pdf (last 
visited June 4, 2016) (former Italian Constitution). See also Iaione, supra note 34. 
 184. The principle of horizontal subsidiarity is stated in the Italian Constitution at 
Article 118, paragraph 4. Art. 118, para. 4 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). 
 185. See Iaione, supra note 28. 
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squares and parks, to turning vacant lots and underutilized space or structures 
into useful resources for communities.  
As Ostrom argued, positive externalities occur when action taken with one 
decision making unit simultaneously generate costs or benefits for other units, 
organized at different scales.186 Although higher level governments or officials 
might take the lead on a large-scale problem, the idea is that the responsibility 
lies at different levels. Instead of trying to solve a large (and diffuse) issue alone, 
governments look for allies at different hierarchical levels to facilitate the initia-
tives of proactive citizens who, individually or in groups, are willing to take di-
rect care of the commons. 
Consider one example of the relationship between individual actions and 
larger scale problems: climate change. Climate change is not only a global phe-
nomenon but it also suffers from a classic collective action problem. As such, 
much conventional thinking suggests that this global commons problem is best 
addressed and regulated at the international level. Yet, even a problem at this 
global scale benefits from active citizenship at the local (and even sub-local) lev-
el. As legal scholars have pointed out, individual behavior accounts for one-
third of U.S. contributions to greenhouse gases and thus it is possible to achieve 
significant greenhouse gas emissions by focusing policy on changing individual 
norms and behavior.187 Changes in behavior at a small individual scale may 
seem only to have diffuse benefits, but they in fact end up generating global 
benefits as well as local ones.188 
Horizontal subsidiarity thus prompts governments to look for, and accept, 
allies to facilitate the initiatives of proactive citizens who, individually or in 
groups, are willing to take direct care of the common assets of the city. In a 
sense, the government is looking to share the responsibility of caring for com-
mon goods with an active citizenry. This “sharing” implies that citizens are will-
ing to act for the general interest—to be a city-maker rather than just a city-
user.189 
 186. See Elinor Ostrom, Nested Externalities and Polycentric Institutions, 49 ECON. 
THEORY 356 (2012). 
 187. Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1687-95 (2007). 
 188. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the 
Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
117, 140-42 (2009) (explaining how individuals can struggle to accept that a diffuse, 
ubiquitous problem like clean air or climate change can be mitigated through such 
a seemingly insignificant action as flicking off one’s light switch); John C. 
Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior to Address Climate Change: Options for 
Congress, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 160 (2008) (suggesting that individuals must be 
actors of climate change regulatory strategies because “[t]he problem is too 
daunting to focus simply on the large polluters”). 
 189. See FRUG, supra note 13. 
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Some have argued that this kind of active citizenship constitutes a “third 
sector” of both informal and formal organizations (or collections of individu-
als) outside of the state or market, capable of providing goods and services for 
the well-being of citizens, even as it risks putting too much pressure on resi-
dents.190 We do not mean to equate subsidiarity with devolution of responsibil-
ity by local authorities over the provision of basic public goods and services to 
city residents. Rather, the principle of horizontal subsidiarity is intended to re-
orient public authorities away from the central state to an active citizenry will-
ing to cooperatively govern common resources. 
 
2. Collaboration 
 
Collaboration is another core aspect of commons institutions, more gener-
ally, and of urban commons institutions, more particularly. Collaboration has 
strong political and democratic ramifications. Collaboration, as a general mat-
ter, has emerged as a form of governance to replace adversarial and managerial 
modes of policy making and implementation.191 In this model, several stake-
holders interact in order to implement public policies, or manage crucial assets 
for the community.192 At the level of a common pool resource, active citizens 
become problem solvers and resource managers, able to cooperate and make 
strategic decisions about common assets and to implement them with other cit-
izens and other urban stakeholders.193 The kind of collaborative governance re-
 190. See, e.g., H.P. Bang & E. Sorensens, The Everyday Maker: A New Challenge to 
Democratic Governance, 21 ADMIN. THEORY & PRAXIS 325 (Sept. 1999). 
 191. Chris Ansell and Alison Gash define collaborative governance as  
[a] governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly 
engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process 
that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to 
make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets.  
  Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice, 18 J. 
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 543, 544 (2008). 
 192. The term “stakeholder” can be used to refer both to participation of citizens as 
individuals and to the participation of organized groups, public agencies and non-
state stakeholders. As Lisa Bingham has argued:  
“Collaboration” means working together with diverse interests to achieve 
common goals across boundaries and in multi-agency, multi-sector, and 
multi-actor relationships and may include the general public, state, 
regional, and local government agencies, tribes, non-profit organizations, 
businesses, and other nongovernmental stakeholders to address issues 
that cannot easily be addressed by any one organization on its own. 
  Lisa Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative Law: Building the Legal 
Infrastructure for Collaborative Governance, 10 WIS. L. REV. 297, 350 (2010). 
 193. Cooperation is a crucial factor in the conceptualization of collaborative 
governance. See Philippe C. Schmitter, Participation in Governance Arrangements: 
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flected in commons institutions deeply engages citizens in public-public and 
public-private partnerships with the goal of implementing an arrangement in 
which citizens are governing and not simply being governed.194  Similarly, a com-
mons-based approach to governance at the level of the city can utilize collabo-
ration as a methodological tool through which heterogeneous individuals and 
institutions co-create or co-govern the city, or parts of the city, as a common 
resource. 
One way to think of collaborative governance is through the lens of the 
“triple helix” concept, utilized in innovation studies, in which there occurs a 
shift from an industry-government dyad characterizing the Industrial Society to 
a triadic relationship between university, industry, and government in the 
Knowledge Society.195 The basic idea is that the potential for innovation and 
economic development in a Knowledge Society lies in the hybridization of ele-
ments from university, industry, and government to generate new institutional 
and social formats for the production, transfer and application of knowledge.196 
The knowledge transfer and interactions between these elements are a function 
of the complex set of formal and informal linkages between higher education 
Is There Any Reason To Expect it Will Achieve “Sustainable and Innovative Policies 
in a Multi-Level Context”?, in PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL AND 
SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS 51, 53 (Jürgen Grote & Bernard Gbikpi eds., 2002) 
(“Governance is a method/mechanism for dealing with a broad range of 
problems/conflicts in which actors regularly arrive at mutually satisfactory and 
binding decisions by negotiating with each other and cooperating in the 
implementation of these decisions.”) (italics removed). 
 194. When we refer to the “public” we want to acknowledge that there are two forms of 
“public” actors: the public conceived as the public sector or as a specific 
community or polity. Collaboration is a methodological tool that enables these 
two kinds of public to work with each other, or to work with private actors that 
exist outside of these two publics. 
 195. See Loet Leydesdorff & Henry Etzkowitz, The Triple Helix as a Model for Innovation 
Studies, 25 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 195 (1998).  
 196. The triple helix has components and sub-components among them. Distinctions 
are made between (a) “[i]ndividual and institutional innovators”; (b) “R&D and 
non-R&D innovators”; and (c) “‘[s]ingle-sphere’ and ‘multi-sphere’ (hybrid) 
institutions.” Marina Ranga & Henry Etzkowitz, Triple Helix System: An Analytical 
Framework for Innovation Policy and Practice in the Knowledge Society, 27 INDUS. & 
HIGHER EDUC. 237, 242 (2013). According to the authors, there are two 
complementary perspectives from which is possible to see the triple helix system 
theory: the neo-institutional perspective, which sees the university as the main 
innovation actor, and the neo-evolutionary perspective, which sees the 
“university, industry and government [as] co-evolving sub-sets of social systems 
that interact through an overlay of recursive networks and organizations that 
reshape their institutional arrangements through reflexive sub-dynamics, such as 
markets and technological innovations.” Id. at 239-40. 
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systems, businesses, and the government.197 “The interactions between the three 
strands of the ‘helix’ creates the unique and distinctive characteristics of an in-
novation system . . . at either a national or regional level.”198 
Building on this kind of highly interactive, collaborative governance model 
represented by the triple helix, a quintuple helix model is being experimented 
throughout cities in Italy. There, universities (and also other knowledge-bearing 
institutions such as schools and research and cultural centers) are facilitating 
the creation of partnerships between public and private organizations, on the 
one hand, and social innovators and citizens, on the other hand. In these exper-
iments, urban, environmental, cultural, knowledge, and digital commons are 
co-managed through loosely coupled systems by five actors—the unorganized 
public (i.e., social innovators, active citizens, makers, digital innovators, urban 
regenerators, urban innovators, etc.), public authorities, businesses, civil society 
organizations, and knowledge institutions (i.e., schools, universities, cultural 
academies, etc.)—to establish public-private-community partnerships.199 These 
partnerships have three main aims: living together (collaborative services), 
growing together (collaborative ventures), and making together (collaborative 
urbanism)200 These different elements interact together to produce shared value 
or collective goods in the growth and revitalization of cities. 
Designing collaborative processes, or institutions, to include a wide range 
of citizens, particularly those most vulnerable to being excluded from decision 
making processes on account of their social or economic status, is important for 
governing any common pool resource. We must be careful not to romanticize 
collaboration as a commons principle. It is important for urban reformers to 
heed the lessons of failed collaborative urban governance practices which simp-
ly devolve planning processes to the sublocal level without offering new tools 
and resources to enable meaningful collaboration, or to make truly accessible 
urban assets, for a broader class of city residents.201 The best collaborative urban 
 197. Morten Berg-Jensen et al., Forms of Knowledge and Modes of Innovation, 35 RES. 
POL’Y 5 (2007). 
 198. Rebecca Harding, Fostering University-Industry Links, in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION AND DEV., STRENGTHENING ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN EAST GERMANY: LESSONS FROM LOCAL APPROACHES 139, 142 (Mar. 
2009), http://www.oecd.org/site/cfecpr/42367462.pdf.  
 199. See infra Part III.C. On the quintuple helix governance model, see also Christian 
Iaione & Paola Cannavò, The Collaborative and Polycentric Governance of the 
Urban and Local Commons, 5 URB. PAMPHLETEER 29 (2015). 
 200. Christian Iaione, CO-Mantova as the Trigger for a Co-Cities Movement, LABGOV 
(Nov. 27, 2014), http://www.labgov.it/co-mantova-co-cities/.  
 201. Here we acknowledge the literature critiquing collaborative planning experiments 
in cities around the world as prone to domination by economic elites and/or 
strong or corrupt sublocal leadership, excluding the poor and vulnerable from 
claiming and sharing in the revitalization of neighborhoods and cities. See, e.g., 
Sarah Elwood, Partnerships and Participation: Reconfiguring Urban Governance in 
Different State Contexts, 25 URB. GEOGRAPHY 755 (2015) (comparing the discourses 
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development processes, in our view, deeply engage and empower a wide range 
of actors in the revitalization of city space and in the management of neighbor-
hood assets. 
We embrace urban commons-based experimentation which has both a 
governance component and resource-sharing component that allows residents 
access to, and use of, local assets (even if temporary). This promotes not only 
inclusive development practices but also new forms of urban welfare provision-
ing through commons management. An example of a collaborative urban 
commons framework that bridges these two elements—the commons as shared 
assets and governance—is the recently implemented Bologna regulation on the 
urban commons, which is described below. 
 
3. Polycentricism 
 
Collaboration with other stakeholders and institutions (both public and 
private) can lead to common resources being managed in a “polycentric” man-
ner—i.e., neither exclusively owned nor centrally regulated. The polycentric 
approach to governance was first proposed by Vincent Ostrom, Charles Tie-
bout, and Robert Warren to connote “many centers of decisionmaking which 
are formally independent of each other” but which “may function in a coherent 
manner with consistent and predictable patterns of interacting behavior.”202 In-
stead of a global, top down regime in which lower levels of government carry 
out the mandates from above, the polycentric approach “provides for greater 
experimentation, learning, and cross-influence among different levels and units 
of government, which are both independent and interdependent”203 
and practices of purportedly collaborative or “partnership” rapprochements to 
urban governance in the United States and United Kingdom as enacted through 
nationally directed planning and revitalization program); Sarah 
Elwood, Neighborhood Revitalization Through ‘Collaboration’: Assessing the 
Implications of Neoliberal Urban Policy at the Grassroots, 58 GEOJOURNAL 121 (2002) 
(using example of a collaborative revitalization program in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota); Marie-Hélène Zérah, Participatory Governance in Urban Management 
and the Shifting Geometry of Power in Mumbai, 40 DEV. & CHANGE 853 
(2009) (questioning the participatory dimension of urban governance in Mumbai 
based on surveys of a number of collaborative public private partnerships for 
urban services and infrastructure provision); Soumyadip 
Chatapadhyay, Contesting Inclusiveness: Policies, Politics and Processes of 
Participatory Urban Governance in Indian Cities, 15 PROGRESS IN DEV. STUD. 1 
(2015) (examining participatory governance arrangements in major Indian cities 
characterized by the involvement of neighborhood associations/residents’ welfare 
associations (RWAs) and NGOs). 
 202. Vincent Ostrom, Charles Mills Tiebout, & Robert Warren, The Organization Of 
Government In Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 4 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 831, 
831 (1961). 
 203. Daniel H. Cole, From Global to Polycentric Climate Governance, 2 CLIMATE L. 395 
(2011). 
332 
 
Foster Iaione FINAL COPY.docx (Do Not Delete) 7/29/2016  4:57 PM 
THE CITY AS A COMMONS  
The polycentric approach to commons governance was fully embraced by 
Elinor Ostrom in her studies of commons institutions in the natural resources 
context. According to Ostrom, the two organizational forms for commons 
management theorized in the mid-twentieth century—the market and the state, 
the first for the production of private goods and the second for non-private 
goods—do not “adequately deal with the wide diversity of institutional ar-
rangements that humans craft to govern, provide and manage public goods and 
common-pool resources.”204 A polycentric approach to local governance locates 
commons institutions in between the market and the state. 
Polycentrism is not just about the participation of several levels of govern-
ments in providing public goods or delivering services; “polycentric governance 
requires a certain level of independence and interdependence between govern-
ance institutions and organizations at various levels.”205 As Daniel Cole has ar-
gued, to understand the polycentric approach is to understand the distinction 
between government and governance: governance is not just ‘what governments 
do’206 because governance is not a function limited to the State; rather, myriad 
non-governmental organizations, local neighborhood associations, individual 
property owners, etc. can (and already do) play an important role in governing 
resources.207 A polycentric system is thus, ideally, “a system in which govern-
mental units both compete and cooperate, interact and learn from one other, 
and responsibilities at different governmental levels are tailored to match the 
scale of the public services they provide.”208 
Some urban commons institutions, like BIDs and Park Conservancies, pos-
sess many of the characteristics of polycentric governance. In fact, such institu-
tions very much resemble those identified in Elinor Ostrom’s study of a series of 
groundwater basins located beneath the Los Angeles metropolitan area.209 In 
her findings, groundwater producers organized voluntary associations, negoti-
ated settlements of water rights, and created special water districts to monitor 
and enforce those rights with the assistance of county and state authorities. 
State legislation authorizing the creation of special water districts by local citi-
zens, in particular, was a crucial element in encouraging users of groundwater 
 204. Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex 
Economic Systems, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 641, 642 (2010). 
 205. Cole, supra note 203, at 396. 
 206. See also Jouni Paavola, Climate Change: The Ultimate “Tragedy of the Commons”?, 
in PROPERTY IN LAND AND OTHER RESOURCES 417 (Daniel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom 
eds., 2011). 
 207. Cole, supra note 203, at 397. 
 208. Id. at 405. 
 209. See OSTROM, supra note 17, at 103-42 (discussing the case studies of user groups in 
three California groundwater basins). 
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basins to invest in self-organization and the supply of a local institution.210 
Ostrom viewed the relationship between the private water associations, public 
agencies, and special districts as illustrating how a governance system “can 
evolve to remain largely in the public sector without being a central regula-
tor.”211 
Thus, all the actors in a polycentric governance regime are part of an au-
tonomous center of decision and can realize activities for the urban commons, 
coordinated and enabled by the public authority. The role of the State becomes 
that of providing them necessary tools (including appropriate public policies 
packaged as collaborative devices), connecting the several networks of actors, 
and helping the so-called “collaborative class” to enlarge the boundaries of in-
novation. In this kind of system, “many elements are capable of making mutual 
adjustments for ordering their relationships with one another within a general 
systems of rules where each element acts with interdependence of other ele-
ments.”212 
 
IV. The City As A Commons 
 
As we have argued, the city is a commons by virtue of its openness and po-
tential for rivalry. It is this very openness that lends the city commons a para-
doxical quality that often puts it in tension with itself. On the one hand, it is the 
openness of cities that allows them to make and remake themselves, and to 
compete for the people and goods that help to grow and sustain them. On other 
hand, the city has finite resources that, by virtue of being open, are subject to 
congestion and exhaustion, rendering those cities vulnerable to rivalry. This ri-
valry often puts in conflict different kinds of commons, or commons claims, 
leading not only to the sacrifice of one urban good (e.g. a park or garden) for 
another (e.g. housing) but the sacrifice of the needs of the socially and econom-
ically powerless for the desires of the more powerful. 
How cities manage, or govern in the face of, the potential for rivalry and 
tensions between competing claims to the commons is at the heart of the gov-
ernance question that we address in this Part. There is no one system that can 
satisfactorily mediate the tensions that arise from rivalry for common resources, 
nor that can resolve distributional inequalities with regard to those resources. 
 210. The special district, though central to the relationship among users, was only one 
public enterprise among a half dozen agencies that were actively involved in the 
management of the basins. In addition to the public districts, private water 
associations were also active in each groundwater basin. Once a special district was 
created, it possessed a wide variety of powers. Those powers included the ability to 
raise revenue through a water pump tax and, to a limited extent through a 
property tax, to undertake collective actions to replenish a groundwater basin. Id. 
at 129. 
 211. Id. at 135-36. 
 212. See Vincent Ostrom, Polycentricity, in POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC 
ECONOMICS 57 (Michael McGinnis ed., 1999).  
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However, there are alternatives to the current system—one in which local gov-
ernments hold a monopoly over common resources and in which the vastly un-
equal influence over relevant decisions by elites and narrow interest groups op-
erates to the detriment of large swaths of the urban population. 
In this Part, we begin to sketch out an alternative vision of city governance 
in which heterogeneous individuals and institutions can collaborate together to 
co-create or co-govern the city, or parts of the city, as a common resource. Here 
we lay out the conceptual pillars of what we call an “urban collaborative gov-
ernance” which conceives of the role of the state according to the design princi-
ples set out in the previous Part and introduces a strong element of social and 
economic equity or inclusion. We also provide and explore two emerging ex-
amples on the ground of what this model of urban collaborative governance 
might look like in practice: the sharing city and the collaborative city. 
 
A. Urban Collaborative Governance 
 
The core impetus to conceive of the city as a commons aims at changing 
the democratic and economic functioning of the city. This change is necessary 
not only to create a city that better functions according to the needs of all of its 
citizens, but also to acknowledge the trend towards massive urbanization and 
the reality that cities are becoming the center of political life.213 As we have seen 
with the above examples of existing urban commons institutions, it is possible 
to re-situate the role of the state, or city, as an enabler and facilitator of collabo-
ration and ultimately of political and economic redistribution. 
The idea of the state as a facilitator—a relational state214—is part of the 
move from a “command and control” system of governance to what we call 
“urban collaborative governance,” a system which at its core redistributes deci-
sion making power and influence away from the center and towards an engaged 
public. The facilitator state creates the conditions under which citizens can de-
velop collaborative relationships with each other, and cooperate both together 
and with public authorities, to take care of common resources, including the 
city itself as a resource.215 Further, if the city itself is a shared resource, then a 
strong collaborative system of decision making should also nudge towards re-
distributing some of the assets of the city to support differently-situated indi-
viduals and communities within the city. This idea is akin to the “city-making” 
 213. See BENJAMIN BARBER, IF MAYORS RULED THE WORLD: DYSFUNCTIONAL NATIONS, 
RISING CITIES (2013). 
 214. See generally Geoff Mulgan, Government With the People: The Outlines of a 
Relational State, and Marc Stears, The Case for a State That Supports Relationships, 
Not a Relational State, in THE RELATIONAL STATE: HOW RECOGNISING THE 
IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS COULD REVOLUTIONISE THE ROLE OF THE 
STATE 20, 35 (Graeme Cooke & Rick Muir eds., 2012). 
 215. See R. Quentin Grafton, Governance Of The Commons: A New Role For The State?, 
76 LAND ECON. 504 (2000). 
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that Frug proposed in which he advocated transforming cities, and city services, 
into vehicles for community building across local government boundaries.216 In 
a similar way, a commons-based governance approach envisions cities as vehi-
cles for collaboration across formal governance arrangements toward social and 
economic inclusion. 
 
1. Re-Designing City Hall 
 
To imagine the morphology of the City government as a facilitator, it is 
necessary to move away from the Leviathan, or the Gargantua,217 and design an 
institutional system without a dominant center—one which involves other ac-
tors in decision making and administrative implementation processes, consid-
ering such actors as peer co-workers or co-designers. As we discussed earlier, 
commons-based institutions are characterized by a move away from a vertically 
(top-down) oriented world to a horizontally organized one in which the state, 
citizens, and a variety of other actors collaborate and take responsibility for 
common resources. The institutional settings where urban collaborative de-
mocracy can take place are places of networking, of connecting and coordinat-
ing different and autonomous actions for the same shared goals. 
The challenge of networked governance may be that its structure resembles 
a loosely coupled system, subject to fraying at the margins and not glued to-
gether enough to be organizationally coherent.218 As Daniela Piana has empha-
sized, the concept of a loosely coupled system, introduced by Karl Weick,219 de-
scribes a system where the connections among its units are weak, but flexible 
enough to easily react and adapt to horizontal patterns of coordination.220 
However, although loosely coupled systems may be adaptive, they can lose con-
sistency and predictability if repeatedly confronted with abrupt and unpredict-
able change.221 
 216. See FRUG, supra note 13.  
 217. Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren use the Gargantua name in order to describe the 
organization of metropolitan governance as a political system with a single 
dominant center for making decisions. See Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, supra note 
202, at 831. The term is taken from the work of Robert Wood. See Robert Wood, 
The New Metropolis: Green Blets, Grass Roots or Gargantua, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
108-22 (1958). “Gargantua” is “the invention of a single metropolitan government 
or at least the establishment of a regional superstructure which points in that 
direction.” Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, supra note 202, at 831. 
 218. Karl Weick, Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems, 21 ADMIN. SCI. 
Q. 1 (1976). 
 219. Daniela Piana, Assessing and Filling the Gap as a New Mode of Governance, Lessons 
from a Preliminary Study Carried Out in the Cosenza’s Public Prosecutors’ Office, 4 
INT’L J. FOR CT. ADMIN. 46 (2012). 
 220. Id. at 50. 
 221. Id. 
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What stabilizes the kind of collaborative institutional ecosystem that we en-
vision is the role of the public authority, which becomes that of coordinator and 
mediator in co-design processes. In this sense, the networks, actions and reac-
tions of others in the ecosystem are independent and free but nested within the 
local government, consistent with a polycentric system. Elected officials behave 
no longer as “citizens’ representatives” but rather as “collaborative institutional 
ecosystem managers.” City officials and staff are tasked to assist, collaborate, 
and provide technical guidance (data, legal advice, communication strategy, de-
sign strategies, sustainability models, etc.) to enable themselves to manage, me-
diate, and coordinate the ecosystem. The role of a public official is therefore 
that of manager, enabling and supporting (and perhaps coordinating) parts of 
the ecosystem to allow it to “nest” within the larger policy of the city. 
 
2. Co-Designing the City 
 
In general, public decision making processes typically follow three different 
logics: a majoritarian logic, a negotiated logic, or a deliberative logic.222 In an 
urban collaborative democracy, the logic should be a collaborative logic based 
on the development of shared norms and shared goals. This logic is focused on 
the collaborative decisionmaking and collaborative design, both processes 
which have as their task the identification of common goals, means to achieve 
those goals, and the mechanisms by which to share roles and responsibilities in 
the implementation of them. Public authorities and public officials are still en-
gaged in policymaking, but debate about public policy is no longer developed 
inside political parties, or inside city councils, but instead inside other civic are-
nas. This transformation thus implies the development of collaborative devices, 
inspired by the design principles described in this Article, that help local au-
thorities to facilitate and foster this debate and decision making along the logic 
of collaboration. Collaborative decision making, like other forms of democratic 
innovation beyond representative democracy, is designed to increase and deep-
en public participation in public decisionmaking processes.223 
One example of these new civic arenas are Urban Collaborative Labs, or liv-
ing labs,224 which are user-centered open innovation ecosystems that can be fo-
cused on a neighborhood, city, or region.225 Regardless of the geographic or ter-
 222. DONATELLA DELLA PORTA, LA POLITICA LOCALE 254 (2006). 
 223. See generally GRAHAM SMITH, DEMOCRATIC INNOVATIONS: DESIGNING INSTITUTION 
FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION (2009). 
 224. More information about the Living Lab model, active both in the European and 
American contexts, is available at Living Labs, MASS. INST. OF TECHNOLOGY, 
http://livinglabs.mit.edu (last visited June 4, 2016), and Open Living Labs, EUR. 
NETWORK OF LIVING LABS, http://www.openlivinglabs.eu (last visited June 4, 2016). 
 225. An inspiration may come from the Assembly of The Commons, a proposal 
developed by P2P Foundation. See Assembly of the Commons, P2P FOUND., http:// 
p2pfoundation.net/Assembly_of_the_Commons (last visited June 4, 2016). 
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ritorial focus, they are a co-design process that has the effect of profoundly 
shaping and affecting the urban planning process. There are no requirements or 
selection criteria to access the Labs, and participation is elective and open to 
everyone who is interested. The living lab approach has proven well suited for 
instantiating urban collaborative governance ideals because of its user co-
creation approach to identify and integrate the most innovative approaches to 
planning and for navigating the constraints posed by existing institutional 
frameworks.226 These informal spaces should be at the heart of the collaborative 
institutional ecosystem and are important for managing the city as a commons. 
The governance output that emerges from this collaborative process is the 
co-design of particular urban commons, and neighborhoods, as well as the co-
production of community services at the city and neighborhood level. However, 
these very sophisticated processes and institutional architectures are new and 
complex to design. This is why they do not always function as they should. For 
instance, these collaborative, co-design processes can break down when local 
(or sublocal) factions no longer agree with the governance process in which 
they are involved, or no longer agree with the goals or plans designed for a 
neighborhood or for a particular local good. When this occurs, the potential of 
public officials in their active role as co-designer, or mediator, is perhaps at its 
highest. In the mediator role, city officials might find an informal solution to 
the conflict, helping the parties find common synergies and perhaps even infus-
ing the governance arrangement with different proposals or decision making 
tools. 
If the conflict continues to exist, the solution might then be found through 
instruments of direct and deliberative democracy, including a larger portion of 
city inhabitants (direct neighborhood referendum or public consultation or re-
sorting to mini-publics and other deliberative procedures227 to reach consen-
sus). If all else fails and a real stalemate emerges, cities could establish a Com-
mons Court to mediate the conflict. Collaborative policymakers and 
bureaucrats, for example, might establish “deliberative or participatory process-
es,” “local commons courts,” or other dispute resolution-like mechanisms that 
perform an arbitrage role where the co-design process is not able to lead to in-
tegration or coordination of different collaboration proposals. 
 
 
 
 
 226. Frank Nevens et al., Urban Transition Labs: Co-creating Transformative Action for 
Sustainable Cities, 50 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 111-22 (2013). 
 227. For a more comprehensive introduction to deliberative methods and techniques, 
see KIMMO GRÖNLUND ET AL., DELIBERATIVE MINI-PUBLICS: INVOLVING CITIZENS IN 
THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS (2014). See also James Fishkin & Robert Luskin, 
Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal: Deliberative Polling and Public Opinion, 40 
ACTA POLITICA 284 (2005); Ian O’Flynn, Deliberative Democracy, the Public Interest 
and the Consociational Model, 58 POL. STUD. 572 (2010). 
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3. Redistributing Political Power 
 
The concept of urban collaborative governance is not simply another artic-
ulation of deliberative democracy.228 Supporters of deliberative democracy may, 
for instance, argue that a certain institutional design or procedure is able to 
“produce a reflexive change of beliefs through deliberation,”229 and that “pref-
erences of citizens and their representatives can be transformed in the process 
of exchanging arguments.”230 Collaborative democracy instead involves a differ-
ent type of institutional complexity because it requires “a resymbolisation of the 
place of power that is thicker than a ‘network of actors or stakeholders.”231 In an 
urban collaborative democracy, governance is in need of an institutional plat-
form where the politics can become visible, equal, contestable, and legitimate. 
These are platforms where the relationship between power, law, and knowledge 
is re-defined. It is a place where instead of hierarchies of power and wildly une-
qual bargaining positions, we see networks of empowered members where the 
inhabitants and stakeholders are co-creating, co-designing, and co-
implementing planning and other public policy solutions for complex urban 
environments together with policymakers and local officials. 
Nevertheless, the institutional scenarios envisioned and discussed here as 
co-design spaces for collaborative policies can present problems of accountabil-
ity and legitimacy because the decision-making process takes place in settings 
that bypass representative channels of democracy. In the traditional model of a 
representative democracy, what a government decides is assumed to represent 
the will of the people. Governance arrangements are usually voluntary ar-
rangements and therefore bind only those who are actually involved in the gov-
ernance scheme. However, in the case of urban commons governance institu-
tions the governance arrangement may affect the everyday life of all city 
inhabitants that fall within the boundaries of the governance scheme (think of 
the BIDs, the decisions of which can have an impact also on those who are not 
part of the BID governance). As a consequence there is a real concern about the 
legitimacy of these collaborative governance settings.232 
 228. See, e.g., JAMES S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
AND PUBLIC CONSULTATION (2011); JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND 
DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991). 
 229. Rainer Baubock, Normative Political Theory and Empirical Research, in 
APPROACHES AND METHODOLOGY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 40, 55 (Donatella Della 
Porta & Michael Keating eds., 2008). 
 230. Id. at 46, 65. 
 231. Matthias Lievens, From Government to Governance: A Symbolic Mutation and Its 
Repercussions for Democracy, 63 POL. STUD. 2, 14 (2014). 
 232. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement 
Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 455-62 (1999) (discussing 
problems with accountability of BIDs and calling for more active monitoring of 
them). 
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There are other concerns, to be sure, with these new co-design processes 
that we want to flag but cannot yet resolve. One is related to social equality: are 
collaboration arenas able to guarantee equal access by underrepresented groups 
who are too often unable to access political and larger decision making process-
es, or can the potential of such collaborative processes represent a significant 
step towards a more egalitarian process than currently exists? How can we avoid 
the risk that the collaborative ecosystem produces output that results in a 
patchwork, instead of a network, of governance arrangements for the urban 
commons? If the Urban Collaborative Democracy can serve as an integration of 
representative democracy at the hyper-local level, we should investigate whether 
it provides political legitimacy; in other words, as Jody Freeman highlights, 
“[H]ow can we be sure that the products of collaboration . . . will be legiti-
mate?”233 How can we provide accountability and legitimacy in an urban col-
laborative democracy where elected and public officials act as co-designers? We 
do not have answers to these questions but agree only that they should be raised 
and constantly invoked to interrogate collaborative processes designed in line 
with our vision of urban collaborative governance. 
 
4. Social and Economic Inclusion 
 
At the heart of the idea that city is a commons is the idea that its resources 
should be shared more widely throughout its communities and on behalf of its 
inhabitants, particularly the least powerful. As such, reconceiving the city as a 
commons can be a powerful tool to fight inequality in cities. The argument is 
two-fold: urban commons can be both a tool to increase the private wealth of 
single households and a stock of resources that can be used to more fairly dis-
tribute social and economic resources. 
First, individual common resources in the city can be a way to improve the 
quality of life (and also the value of owned assets) and a means to improve in-
come and find or create jobs. On the one hand, we know that the provision of 
housing is essential for the livelihood of all234 and that the value of a particular 
dwelling is highly dependent on the quality of the surrounding shared neigh-
borhood amenities (e.g. public space, infrastructure, schools, etc.).235 On the 
other hand, these shared amenities can be a way to foster social inclusion if they 
are used as places or means for people to learn skills, obtain access to job op-
portunities, socialize, and to access social services that increase economic inclu-
 233. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 82 (1997). 
 234. Jim Kemeny, Comparative Housing and Welfare: Theorising the Relationship, 16 J. 
HOUSING & BUILT ENVT. 53 (2001). 
 235. ROBERT FRANK, THE DARWIN ECONOMY: LIBERTY, COMPETITION, AND THE COMMON 
GOOD (2011). 
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sion and urban livability.236 The concept of “makerhoods”—an urban planning 
and economic development strategy that seeks to unleash micro-entrepreneurs 
to strengthen communities through natural and affordable live/work accom-
modations—embodies this mix of inclusive, affordable, and shared space in 
which people can earn a living and still sustain themselves while establishing 
small businesses.237 
The second aspect is that repositioning the city as a commons, as a resource 
belonging to us all, gives legitimacy to the city government to enact redistribu-
tion policies and accommodate as many people as possible in a city. Taxing the 
wealthy238 does not, by itself, help the poor. The city as commons can be instead 
the object of an innovative planning and distribution of the resources of the 
city. First, high-income citizens could be nudged to philanthropically transfer 
or grant “civic use” of private assets to low-income people. Second, the local 
government could use its assets to grant either permanently or temporarily a 
“commons endowment” or a “commons minimum inheritance” at adulthood 
or upon losing a job to enable individuals to become retrained or to find a new 
means of making a living. This is very similar to what has been proposed by 
supporters of basic income policies or by Atkinson, who advanced the idea of a 
minimum heritage for all citizens.239 The point is that thinking of the city as an 
institution that promotes collaboration all the way across and down as a way to 
“share” the resources it controls can spur a host of innovative and progressive 
policies that address the social and economic inequality that is becoming a fea-
ture of 21st century urbanization. 
 
5. Pooling Economies 
 
Another pillar of urban collaborative democracy is the change in economic 
functioning of the city. Poolism may be an appropriate definition to describe 
current economic trends in the urban context. Forms of co-production of 
goods and sharing practices are spreading in cities all over the world. Experi-
ences like co-working spaces (profit or nonprofit) and Fab Lab networks are 
emblematic of this process. A clear distinction should be made, however, be-
tween a sharing and a pooling economy. The phenomena that has recently been 
defined as a sharing economy builds on new or revived social patterns that have 
important business, legal and institutional implications, particularly in cities.240 
 236. Christa Pelikan et al., Welfare Policies as Resource Management, in WELFARE POLICY 
FROM BELOW: STRUGGLES AGAINST SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN EUROPE 255 (Heinz 
Steinert & Arno Pilgram eds., 2003). 
 237. See, e.g., MAKERHOODS, http://www.makerhoods.org/ (last visited June 4, 2016). 
 238. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 515 (2013). 
 239. See ANTHONY ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 303 (2015). 
 240. See Nestor M. Davidson & John Infranca, The Sharing Economy as an Urban 
Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
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Poolism refers instead to practices of “collaborative economy” that foster peer-
to-peer approaches and/or involve users in the design of the productive process 
or transform users into a community.241 Thus, “commons-based econo-
my”, ”open cooperativism”, or “open platform cooperativism” are better terms, 
in our view, for sharing economy initiatives that are collectively owned or man-
aged, democratically governed, and do not extract value out of local economies 
but rather anchor jobs, cultivate respect for human dignity, and offer new forms 
of social security. 
The growth of the sharing economy should only partially be considered a 
fundamental change in economic functioning as a consequence of the recent 
economic crisis.242 In some respects it might also represent, thanks to infor-
mation technologies, the reverse-transformation243 or the transition244 of some 
sectors of the current economic model to long-standing economic traditions 
and economic models (e.g. cooperative economy, social economy, solidarity 
economy, handicraft production, commons economy etc.) and even to ancient 
forms of economic exchange (e.g. the bartering economy), which are alterna-
tives to capital-intensive forms of market economy.245 
An application of this approach is represented by innovative forms of 
poolism. Such forms involve collaborative housing, especially when addressed 
to vulnerable groups in society (we can already see some application of this ap-
 241. The distinction between ‘pooling’ and ‘sharing economy’ has been recognized by 
the European Union in the Committee of the Regions opinion EUR. UNION, 
COMM. OF THE REGIONS, THE LOCAL AND REGIONAL DIMENSION OF THE SHARING 
ECONOMY (Dec. 3-4, 2015), https://webapi.cor.europa.eu/documentsanonymous/ 
COR-2015-02698-00-00-AC-TRA-EN.docx/content (download). 
 242. See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (1944). According to Polanyi and other pre-capitalist 
historians, allocation in many earlier urban civilizations took place in three ways: 
redistribution, regulated markets and reciprocity. Sharing economy seems to be 
inspired to the latter. 
 243. COMMONS TRANSITION, http://commonstransition.org/ (last visited June 4, 2016). 
 244. See PAT CONATY & DAVID BOLLIER, TOWARD AN OPEN CO-OPERATIVISM: A NEW 
SOCIAL ECONOMY BASED ON OPEN PLATFORMS, CO-OPERATIVE MODELS AND THE 
COMMONS (Aug. 27-28, 2014), http://bollier.org/sites/default/files/misc-file-
upload/files/Open%20Co-operativism%20Report%2C%20January%202015_0.pdf. 
See also Trebor Scholz, Platform Cooperativism vs. the Sharing Economy, MEDIUM 
(Dec. 5, 2014), https://medium.com/@trebors/platform-cooperativism-vs-the-
sharing-economy-2ea737f1b5ad#.1gg6ctgg7.  
 245. See, e.g., JEREMY RIFKIN, THE ZERO MARGINAL COST SOCIETY: THE INTERNET OF 
THINGS, THE COLLABORATIVE COMMONS, AND THE ECLIPSE OF CAPITALISM 19-20 
(2015) (explaining how a market-based, highly competitive economy which has 
driven marginal costs to zero has helped spawn a hybrid economy—part capitalist 
and part collaborative economy—assisted by a new technology infrastructure 
which allows more sharing of goods and knowledge and is leading to the 
replacement of “exchange value” with “sharable value”). 
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proach with regards to elderly people246) as well as co-production of communi-
ty services (energy cooperatives, water distribution, collaborative waste man-
agement).247 
 
B. The View from the Ground 
 
Cities worldwide are experimenting with policies that are inspired by the 
idea of sharing and the commons. Many of them do not use the language of the 
commons, but some of them do. These cities are emerging in ways that demon-
strate some of the pillars of our urban collaborative model. We offer two exam-
ples of cities governing themselves along the lines of a “commons.” The first is 
the now well-recognized “sharing city,” which applies such features embedded 
within the idea of urban collaborative democracy, particularly on a neighbor-
hood scale. 
The other example is the “collaborative city,” which explicitly utilizes the 
language of the commons and tries to implement an urban vision consistent 
with principles of urban collaborative democracy. These are two exceptionally 
innovative attempts to re-situate the city government and to facilitate collabo-
ration in reaching common goals and caring for common goods. We offer them 
here not as perfect examples of our models but as significant steps towards its 
realization. 
 
1. The Sharing City 
 
Seoul is the world’s first sharing city. In Seoul, citizens are the “mayor,” ac-
cording to the formal mayor of Seoul.248 The city government decided to em-
power “collective governance” of the city, a governance strategy based on com-
munication and collaboration with citizens. The Sharing City Project is made 
possible thanks to the approval of the “Seoul Metropolitan Government Ordi-
nance for the Promotion of Sharing.”249 The main goal of the Sharing City Pro-
 246. See the activities of the New York Foundation for Senior Citizens, N.Y. FOUND. 
FOR SENIOR CITIZNS, http://www.nyfsc.org/ (last visited June 4, 2016), and the 
experience of a digital platform developed by the city of Barcelona, Vincles BCN, 
BARCELONA, http://smartcity.bcn.cat/en/vincles-bcn.html (last visited June 4, 
2016), to fight against isolation of seniors by sharing the time of relatives and 
neighbors.  
 247. See, e.g., Anna Schreuer & Daniela Weismeier-Sammer, Energy Cooperatives and 
Local Ownership in the Field of Renewable Energy Technologies: A Literature Review 
(Vienna Univ. Econ. & Bus., Res. Inst. for Co-Operation & Co-Operatives, 
Research Report No. 2010/4, 2010), http://epub.wu.ac.at/2897/. 
 248. Park Won-Soon, In Seoul, The Citizens Are The Mayor, 74 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 442 
(2014). 
 249. Seoul Metropolitan Government Ordinance on the Promotion of Sharing, No. 
5619 (Jan. 9, 2014), SEOUL METRO. GOV’T, http://legal.seoul.go.kr/legal/english/ 
front/page/law.html?pAct=lawView&pPromNo=1191 (last visited June 4, 2016). 
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ject is the promotion of the sharing approach and sharing practices in the city of 
Seoul.250 
Article 8 of the Ordinance provides a number of core defining terms. The 
term “sharing” means activities that create social, economic and environmental 
values by jointly using resources, such as space, goods, information, talent and 
experience. A “sharing enterprise” is an enterprise intending to contribute to 
the solution of social problems—such as economy, welfare, culture, environ-
ment, and traffic—through sharing practices. A “sharing organization” is an or-
ganization or corporation designated pursuant to Article 8, i.e., a nonprofit, 
nongovernmental organization or nonprofit corporation, which intends to con-
tribute to the solution of social problems, such as economy, welfare, culture, 
environment, and traffic, through sharing. 
Under the Ordinance the city mayor can designate sharing organizations 
and sharing enterprises that “shall endeavor to disseminate sharing culture and 
promote citizen’s convenience.”251 The mayor may also provide subsidies to 
sharing organizations or enterprises, following deliberations by the Sharing 
Committee, and provide administrative support. When introducing the pro-
gram, the mayor announced that ten sharing enterprises were to be subsidized 
with 250 million Won. The mayor also announced collaborative mobility in the 
city through the introduction of 492 vehicles for car sharing services. 
To strengthen sharing and collaboration with and among citizens—who, 
according to the mayor, should no longer be at the receiving end of policies but 
rather play an active role in shaping public policies252—the city undertook to 
design new infrastructure to receive information, feedback, and sharing practic-
es from citizens. This new infrastructure includes the Seoul Citizen’s Hall, a 
public space located at the basement of city hall where citizens can communi-
 250. To achieve this goal, in the framework of a collaborative and communicative state: 
The Mayor shall actively promote related policies including the following 
for the promotion of sharing: 
1.Support for the discovery of sharing areas and practice; 
2.Promotion of and support for sharing organizations and sharing 
enterprises; 
3.Dissemination of awareness for the promotion of sharing; 
4.Improvement of laws and regulations and systems for the promotion of 
sharing; 
5. Cooperation among Korean and foreign organizations, enterprises and 
institutions related to sharing; and 
6.Other matters deemed necessary for the promotion of sharing. 
  Id. art. 5. 
 251. Id. art. 8.  
 252. Won-Soon, supra note 248. 
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cate and collaborate with public administration,253 and a Social Networking 
Services administration to pursue active communication with citizens through 
social networking channels such as Twitter and an online platform that pub-
lishes open data to foster transparency and encourage sharing. 
The most interesting project established by the City, in order to foster in-
novation and collaboration, is the Seoul sharing city project. Seoul sharing city 
is a city-funded initiative and is part of the Social Innovation Bureau (SIB), 
which itself was established with the aim of engaging citizens to understand 
problems and generate solutions for governments to develop and adopt.254 In 
order to advance the Sharing city agenda, the Bureau promotes several projects, 
including “Generation sharing households,” “Sharing bookshelves,” and work-
shops for communication between policy makers and citizens255 
 
2. The Collaborative City 
 
The collaborative city is a commons-based city model. What differentiates 
the sharing city from the collaborative city is the methodological approach: the 
“co-city” protocol. The protocol, developed and experimented in five cities in 
Italy so far, is articulated in three main phases: mapping, experimenting and 
prototyping. Although the aim of the experimentation is to guarantee the ceteris 
paribus256 condition, every field experimentation has its unique aspects due to 
the specific characteristics of the city itself. The aim of the first phase of the pro-
tocol, the mapping phase, is to understand the socio-economic and legal char-
acteristics of the specific urban context. 
The second phase, the experimenting process, is a “collaboration camp” 
where synergies are created between emerging commons projects and the city, 
filtering the collaborative actors from the predatory ones, on one side, and the 
participative one, on the other side. In the second phase, co-working sessions 
organize tests for possible synergies and alignment between projects and rele-
vant actors. These culminate in a “collaboration day,”257 which might take the 
 253. SUNKYUNG HAN ET AL., A SEOUL CITY’S SOCIAL INNOVATION STRATEGY: A MODEL OF 
MULTI-CHANNEL COMMUNICATION TO STRENGTHEN GOVERNANCE AND CITIZEN 
ENGAGEMENT (2013), http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/content/original/ 
Book%20covers/Local%20PDFs/98%20SF%20Han%20Kim%20Rim%20%20Park%20
Seoul%20Citys%20social%20innovation%20strategy%202013.pdf.  
 254. See RUTH PUTTICK ET AL., NESTA & BLOOMBERG PHILANTHROPIES, THE TEAMS AND 
FUNDS MAKING INNOVATION HAPPEN IN GOVERNMENTS AROUND THE WORLD 
(2014). 
 255. See id. at 85. 
 256. This is the Latin phrase for “other things being equal.” 
 257. This is inspired by “Deliberation Day.” The idea of Deliberation Day was 
conceived by Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, born from empirical 
observation of the deliberative polls experiences. Deliberation Day is proposed as a 
new national holiday held a week before national elections. Registered voters are 
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form of placemaking events—e.g., an urban commons civic maintenance festi-
val, temporary utilization of abandoned building or spaces, micro-regeneration 
intervention—to test, experiment and coordinate the ideas that arise out of the 
co-working sessions. 
The third phase, the governance prototyping phase, leads to a different 
governance outcome on the basis of the guidelines extracted during the experi-
mentation phase and on the needs of the specific community or city. As a mat-
ter of fact a crucial characteristic for urban commons-based governance exper-
imentalism is adaptiveness.258As the following paragraphs explain, this phase 
results in the design of governance tools best suited or tailored to local condi-
tions. 
The protocol is the necessary step to create the most favorable environment 
for innovation through urban commoning, by adopting the design principles of 
sharing, collaboration, and polycentrism. The key is to transform the entire city 
or some parts of it into a laboratory259 by creating the proper legal and political 
ecosystem for the installation of shared, collaborative, polycentric urban gov-
ernance schemes.260 This process of democratic experimentalism re-
conceptualizes urban governance along the same lines as the right to the city, 
creating a juridical framework for city rights.261 
called at the neighborhood level to discuss together the key issues of the political 
campaign. The goal of Deliberation Day is production of deliberative public 
opinion at the mass level. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES FISHKIN, DELIBERATION 
DAY 149 (2004). 
 258. The polycentric structure of an adaptive legal system offers tremendous 
opportunities for cities to be leaders in social-ecological resilience. See Craig 
Anthony Arnold, Resilient Cities And Adaptive Law, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 245, 254 
(2014). 
 259. The idea is that the urban level is the best testing ground for democratic 
experimentalism. Democratic experimentalism, and the kind of innovations we 
propose, help to overcome political apathy, reduce the lack of legitimacy, increase 
political satisfaction and lead to more effective policies. See, e.g., Brigitte Geissel, 
Improving the Quality of Democracy at the Local Level: German Experiences 
(May 23-24, 2008), http://www.provincia.tn.it/binary/pat/link_home/geissel 
_Trento_08_final.1211796325.pdf (presented at “Quality of Democracy, 
Participation and Governance: The Local Perspective” conference at Trento, Italy). 
 260. The protocol works as a sort of ‘wind gallery’ for the experimentation of the 
collaborative/polycentric urban governance scheme. The idea of the ‘wind gallery’ 
is inspired by the ‘wind tunnel,’ the innovative solution introduced by the Wright 
brothers that allowed them to successfully perform the first controlled flight at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. See 1901 Wind Tunnel, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & 
SPACE ADMIN., http://wright.nasa.gov/airplane/tunnel.html (last visited June 4, 
2016). 
 261. What we mean by this is that through collaborative, polycentric governance-based 
experiments we can see the right to the city framework be partially realized—e.g., 
the right to be part of the creation of the city, the right to be part of the 
decisionmaking processes shaping the lives of city inhabitants, and the right of 
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The most successful application of the “co-city” protocol is the CO-
Bologna project run in the City of Bologna to design a policy and regulatory 
framework re-shaping the relationship between inhabitants and the local ad-
ministration with regard to urban resources and services.262 The main pillar of 
the CO-Bologna process is the recently enacted regulation on civic collabora-
tion for the urban commons, empowering residents, and others, to collaborate 
with the city to undertake the “care and regeneration” of the “urban commons” 
across the city.263 The “urban commons” covered by the regulation includes 
mainly public spaces, urban green spaces, and abandoned buildings and other 
infrastructure.264 However, its definition of the commons is quite expansive, 
directly relating the concept to the quality of life in the city and the concept of 
human flourishing: 
 [T]he goods, tangible, intangible and digital, that citizens and the Ad-
ministration, also through participative and deliberative procedures, 
recognize to be functional to the individual and collective wellbeing , 
activating consequently towards them, pursuant to article 118, par. 4, of 
the Italian Constitution, to share the responsibility with the Admin-
istration of their care or regeneration in order to improve the collective 
enjoyment.265 
The central regulatory tool is the “collaboration agreement,” signed by citi-
zens and the city, which establishes the object of care, and the rules and condi-
tions of collaboration among any group of citizens and the local government, or 
other actors266 The collaboration could be for long-term care of a common re-
source, or a single or short-term intervention. The regulation also provides for 
inhabitants to shape decisions about the collective resources in which we all have a 
stake. See supra notes 8-10; see also JEAN-BERNARD AUBY, DROIT DE LA VILLE: DU 
FONCTIONNEMENT JURIDIQUE DES VILLES AU DROIT À LA VILLE (2013).  
 262. In the interest of full disclosure, one of the authors, Christian Iaione, was a 
member of the working group which drafted the Bologna Regulation on public 
collaboration for urban commons. See Bologna Regulation on Public Collaboration 
for Urban Commons, LABGOV (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.labgov.it/2014/12/18/ 
bologna-regulation-on-public-collaboration-for-urban-commons/.  
 263. The regulation provides that “[t]he City periodically advertizes the list of spaces, 
buildings or digital infrastructures which could be target of actions of care and 
regeneration, specifying the goals to be pursued through the collaboration with 
active citizens.” See COMUNE DI BOLOGNA, REGULATION ON COLLABORATION 
BETWEEN CITIZENS AND THE CITY FOR THE CARE AND REGENERATION OF URBAN 
COMMONS § 10(6), at 13 (LabGov trans., 2014), http://www.comune.bologna.it/ 
media/files/bolognaregulation.pdf. 
 264. Section 16 speaks of “real estate of the City the buildings [of which are] in [a] state 
of partial or total disuse or decay which . . . are suitable for care and regeneration 
interventions.” Id. § 16(1), at 17. 
 265. Id. § 2(a), at 6.  
 266. Id. §§ 2(e), 5, at 7, 9-11. 
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the transfer of technical and monetary support to the collaboration,267 and ways 
of defining the borders of the particular resource to be managed through a col-
laborative pact. It also contains norms and guidance on the importance of sus-
taining common resources, maintaining the inclusiveness and openness of the 
resource, of proportionality in protecting the public interest, and directing the 
use of common resources towards the “differentiated” public.268 Finally, the 
regulation speaks of fostering urban creativity chiefly through regulating urban 
and street art, and the digital infrastructure.269 
The specific applications of the Bologna regulation are just now undergoing 
implementation as the City has recently signed almost 260 pacts of collabora-
tion, which are tools of shared governance. 
The regulation and other city public policies foresee other governance tools 
inspired by the collaborative and polycentric design principles underlying the 
Regulation. For example the Regulation foresees also that the City supports the 
willingness of inhabitants, private owners, and commercial businesses to create 
street or neighborhood associations, consortiums, cooperatives, foundations to 
manage public space, public urban green spaces and parks, and abandoned and 
creative spaces. 
Also, the City enacted other commons-based public policies that are not 
based on the Regulation. In particular the invitation to tender “Icredibol” and 
the co-design process called “Collaborare è Bologna” are relevant. The first tool 
is a comprehensive plan to use urban abandoned or unutilized public asset to 
install collaborative spaces. The second is a neighborhood collaborative plan-
ning process for understanding what the communities are willing to run as 
commons and co-design solutions to install forms of governance of the urban 
commons. 
For our purposes, the Bologna regulation and the Bologna collaborative 
city program270 are illustrative of the kinds of experimentalist, adaptive, itera-
tive governance and legal tools which allow city inhabitants and actors (i.e., so-
cial innovators, local entrepreneurs, civil society organizations, and knowledge 
institutions willing to work in the general interest) to enter into co-design pro-
cesses with the city leading to local polycentric governance of an array of com-
 267. The regulation makes clear that the city or municipality will make available 
technical support and other forms of assistance to be able to care for or regenerate 
these resources. Title VI is dedicated to the forms of support, see id. tit. VI, §§ 20-
27, at 19-23 (Forms of Support). 
 268. In other words, the care and regeneration depends on the type or nature of the 
urban common and the people whose well-being depend upon it. 
 269. The regulation is a social innovation enabling tool, seeking to promote the birth of 
collaborative economy or sharing economy ventures. Indeed, it has specific 
sections dedicated to “social innovation and collaborative services,” “urban 
creativity,” and “digital innovation.” Id. §§ 7-9, at 11-12. 
 270. The “Bologna Collaborative City” program is a program jointly developed by the 
City of Bologna and the Fondazione del Monte di Bologna and Ravenna. Id. at 2. 
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mon goods in the city. The regulation is at the same time a form of social inno-
vation “enabling” tool which fosters the interaction between urban commoning 
and the collaborative or sharing economy. Indeed the regulation has dedicated 
specific articles to “social innovation and collaborative services,” “urban crea-
tivity” and “digital innovation” which we believe can be the centerpiece of a 
“collaborative city.” 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have argued that, in ever-changing urban contexts worldwide, an “ur-
ban commons” framework captures much of the debate around contested city 
space and urban resources. This framework, which until now has been insuffi-
ciently developed by scholars, considers important urban goods—open squares, 
parks, abandoned buildings, vacant lots, roads and other urban infrastructure—
as part of the collective, or shared, resources of cities. Such common goods, or 
the “commons”, require a more open governance regime than currently exists 
in most cities. The urban commons framework, in addition to its basis in prop-
erty theory, also provides alternatives for managing common goods, and even 
the managing the city itself as a commons. 
The study of commons institutions represents a fundamental transfor-
mation in the way we think about urban law and governance, and perhaps 
sheds new light on burgeoning forms of democratic experimentalism.271 We ar-
ticulated a number of principles, extracted from the various kinds of institu-
tional arrangements already in place, to demonstrate the potential use of an ur-
ban commons framework for local governance practices. In and of itself, the 
potential for what we call urban collaborative governance lies in the enabling of 
ordinary citizens to improve their lives and their communities in ways that 
promote human flourishing. However, we also hold out hope that forms of 
democratic innovation that grow out recognition of the urban commons pro-
vide alternatives for city-making which foster the development of inclusive and 
equitable cities. 
 271. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). 
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